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The Big "MiG"-Question
By Iain Norman
Jan 14, 2003, 21:34






“What to do with my MiGs?” is a predicament that many air arms may find themselves in in recent years. The majority of Russian equipment operators procured their aircraft during the Cold War from the Soviet Union, or bought the exact same types during the 1990s. Only a minority of users, like China and India, which purchased Russian-built aircraft recently, have got reasonably modern aircraft. Others are still getting aircraft equipped to similar standards to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air forces of the late 1980, and a very small number of customers - such as Malaysia - opted for very minor updates with Russian equipment that allowed some minor improvements (in the case of Malaysia, radar updates to allow integration of the R-77 AAM, and the IFR probe). Yet, there are literally thousands of Soviet-, Russian-, and Ukrainian-built aircraft in service in over 70 countries around the world. So what should countries do with their Russian equipment? Upgrade or replace it?

First of all the direction of the air arm must be outlined. If an air arm is being incorporated or expects to be incorporated with the Western (we will define Western as US allied states or Western European nations and similar countries) infrastructure of an organization like NATO or some other Western based/organized military group, than their goals and operational requirements will be vastly different than the air arm simply looking to be a credible military force able to compete with Western equipped air arms. So, as these are likely to be the two main schools of thought we will look at them separately.

Integration With Western Infrastructure

The requirements of this are likely to be based foremost with the compatibility with which an aircraft can interact with Western aircraft. Minor changes will usually cover the addition of a different IFF, more modern radios, and English language tablature and instruments throughout the cockpit. More radical minor changes usually include integration of western-built sub-systems Š like software and hardware Š into the Russian systems, or their replacement by the western systems. Often enough, both the “minor” and “radical minor” changes will prove to be only temporary solutions as organizations such as NATO require certain levels of standardization to be met. Thus “drastic modifications” might be needed, at which stage the air arm will have two basic paths to follow:

A) Firstly an upgrade with the help of the original - now Russian instead of Soviet -company is possible, like the MiG-29SMT, which will provide modern weapons, full multi-role capability, modern avionics and cockpit displays, and - interestingly enough - uses also an increasing number of Western-built sub-systems.

B) Secondly, the customer might go for a replacement of some existing Russian/exSoviet systems by Western-built systems, trying to get most modern possible solutions into the old airframe. An example of this would be the Sniper upgrade offered by Elbit and Aerostar.

Theoretically, these two solutions are remarkably similar: they offer a level of standard comparable to that available on Western aircraft from the 1990s. Certainly, so far nobody has offered a MiG-29 with a completely Western systems or even a full compatibility with Western weapons. No one has offered an upgrade that simply guts the aircraft of it’s Russian systems and delivers an end-product comprised of a Russian airframe with Western systems throughout, even if that is what is highly likely to sell.
The obvious question to this is: would such an upgrade be worth the investment? And, such question is put right along side the question, would it not be better to get really modern airplanes anyway, instead of upgrading the old ones, and spending lots of money only in order to inject few years of life more of into a technologically limited airframe?

Without surprise, in the recent times the later option obviously became pretty attractive to a number of customers. Germany did operate MiG-29s for a few years but has now passed them on to Poland; but, Poland now decided to purchase new F-16s; Hungary is looking to buy Gripens; the Czech Republic will probably follow the suite. I would say this is not the best and is the result of insufficient Western interest and foolish Russian marketing strategy, and would make several suggestions for the upgrading of Russian aircraft.

Illustration of what is possible: the Sniper upgrade taking off. (Aerostar, via Iain Norman)


1.) Could not the reason that the various upgrades have not been implemented be the lack of truly modern upgrade-projects, and the fact that most of those currently offered would bring Soviet/Russian-built fighters only to the western standards of the 1990s?

Answer:
Western aerospace companies need to realize there is a potentially lucrative market in upgrading Russian aircraft and must collaborate with Russian companies to provided new drastic upgrades that look into the future. Currently the problem is that one can buy a MiG-29 upgrade that will bring the existing fleet up to the standard of a block 50 F-16 but will look outdated next to a block 60. Upgrades that give potential and look forward are a must. Only very few Š and usually rather small Š western companies have realized this, and are using the opportunity.


2.) Why should a big expensive upgrade be introduced?

Answer. Russian aircraft often have airframes of excellent design, the MiG-29 has exceptional maneuverability, and an airframe which could certainly last much longer if properly supported. Why throw this away? The originally company can often certify a plane more many more flying hours after an upgrade. With a decent upgrade a MiG-29 could become clearly superior to the F-16 in every way. If done properly, that would not only be cheaper than new aircraft, but would also see the introduction of many common support systems, easing the switch from the standard to upgrade.


3.) What should these new drastic upgrades incorporate?

Answer. They must include the following:
A completely Western avionics package with modular avionics design. If not this, then the willingness - that has not yet to be seen by the Russian designers - to allow for full Western weapons compatibility. Even this should not mean that the Russian avionics should be counted out (the radars fitted to the Su-30MKIs of India are not matched by anything in Western inventories at the moment i.e. 2002) Western weapons would mean considerable changes on certain sub-systems in the avionics, but this could only result with even more superior technology, as - just for example - the radars currently fitted to the Su-30MKIs are unmatched by anything in Western inventories as this is being written. AuthorÕs remark: I donÕt really understand what your trying to say here. We already said earlier in the paragraph that the MKI has a better radar than any thing else. I'd like to do this with it. A completely Western avionics package with modular avionics design. If not this, then the willingness - that has not yet to be seen by the Russian designers - to allow for full Western weapons compatibility. But this should not mean that the Russian avionics should be counted out (the radars fitted to the Su-30MKIs of India are not matched by anything in Western inventories at the moment i.e. 2002) Western weapons would mean considerable changes on certain sub-systems in the Russian avionics, but this could only result with even more superior technology.

When needed, structural modifications must be included. Using the Su-25 as an example, the humpback of the Su-25TM would need to be included on any upgrade, as it offers a large volume of internal space. Again, this would require the full cooperation of the Russian aerospace industry, but this would have positive consequences for all the involved sides Š beside getting the people who built the thing back into the business, which should actually be a must if these are not to be left to go searching for jobs in such places like Iran or North Korea.

Engines that will be easy for the costumer to maintain and acquire spares should be fitted. The Russians have had Š and frequently still have Š a considerable problem supplying spares; in few cases of customers trying to avoid the stop-gaps by ordering huge amounts of spare parts in advance, the Russians have several times either lost the deals, or their negotiators had to be sent back home with heart problems.

The Russians must also be ready and capable to deliver special features (such like thrust-vectoring nozzles), instead of only boasting they have such technology, while actually not being able to supply it.

With this, we have actually started a discussion about the current state of the Russian aircraft industry, which Š in turn Š is the reason why no similar projects were ever realized. The Russians are excellently capable of rising eyebrows by sending their “prototypes” and “new aircraft” to different air-shows, or presenting their “paper designs”. There are actually too many of these. Yet, the aircraft need to have true prototypes Š equipped with all systems fully functioning, and the means for the production of these being developed. If such a project could be realized, it would take the outlay of funds, which in turn would take faith in the feasibility of the project. That asks for a major effort. So far, however, the signs from Russia were not especially positive in this regard.

Not that the Western companies seem keen so far to team-up with the Russians on a one on one basis. The best we have seen so far were some smaller projects between the GEC-Marconi and MiG or Kamov, FIAR and Sukhoi (but far more with the Chinese), or Thomson-CSF and MiG, Elbit and Sukhoi. Yet, such combination of components would be far from being a completely new idea: several British companies have integrated their products on Egyptian MiG-21s and Su-7s already in the early 1980s; we have seen the Indians taking the systems they needed from different companies all over the world to create the Su-30MKI. Firm cooperation could result in even better products.

To keep it short: the companies of both sides would have nothing to lose by partnering. What the Russians stand to gain are big names in the aerospace industry which can do nothing but help export sales. What both sides stand to lose is seeing one side jump the gun. The Russians were upset about the Lancer MiG-21 upgrade, and tried to boast with their ideas about the upgrade for Mirage F.1s, but Western companies are not likely to be influenced by the yelps of the losing party: on the contrary, the number of different western sub-systems being developed for the use on Russian aircraft is constantly rising, just like the number of Soviet/Russian aircraft completely re-equipped with Western avionics and weapons. Yet, the Russians apparently never even came to the idea of going to some Western company which was about to start a major upgrade effort for some MiGs or Mils, and say, “This is were we can help; This is what we have to offer. Why not work together?” Instead, the companies still battle each other, and in the end Š usually after considerable spending for advertising and lobbying Š only few make any profits. What the Western companies stand to gain is a piece of the pie, if they can effectively do an upgrade they can help with the brand new versions currently being marketed and do away with the sort of run-about approach the Indians had to take.

I would also like to see organizations such as NATO incorporate some different guidelines with regard to Russian aircraft and weapons.

Currently, those NATO air arms and their units equipped with Russian designs are foremost treated as “Aggressor Squadrons”, useful only for dissimilar training. Instead, these should be used with a valuable role to play in combat operations. Currently, this is Š however Š impossible, foremost because of the incompatibility of the equipment.

Both the West and the Russians must be more open for cooperation.

The Western companies and military services should recognize Russian achievements in the area of ammunitions and constructions as capable and advanced where the credits are to be given, and also start thinking about using them in combat operations: how about the FAB-500 bombs with the Paveway I or Paveway II guidance systems, for example? This would certainly be a much cheaper solution than using newly-built Mk.80-series of warheads, foremost as there is an abundance of bomb-stocks within the borders of the former USSR.

The upgraded Sniper cockpit, with new HUD, and displays. The display on the left is showing weapons information and the display on the right is showing navigational information. (Aerostar, via Iain Norman)


Decisions of Non-Western-Integrated Countries

The non-Western integrated country is most likely going to be looking at wanting to have a military that meets the standards of a Western airpower doctrine, but may have no particular wish or requirement to use Western equipment. The other half of this dimension is Russia who built all these MiGs and Sukhois. What is Russia going to do with all their MiGs? To throw them away would be a major waste. We will look at these issues separately.

A not so rich or advanced country (like Sudan, or Vietnam) that wishes to bring its air arm up to a modern standard may be able to get along with radical minor changes of a Russian nature - like radar upgrades to allow for R-77 AAMs or changes to allow for Kh-29 or Kh-59 ground attach missiles. or a purely Russian upgrade like the SMT for the MiG-29. They will not have any requirements but to achieve a more modern capabilities, perhaps ARH BVR missiles and EO- and laser-guided PGMs would cover their needs. Their requirements may reflect the need to get an edge over a neighbor rather than be up to a world competitive level. Even Western countries military budgets tend to be tight, and a penny saved is a penny that can be used for social programs!

This leaves the question of Russia. What should they do? They have generations of combat planes. From the MiG-21 to the Su-27 they have a full range of fighters, many of them just sitting around or in storage. Proper upgrading could not only convert their military from the farce that it currently is into a potent force, but could provide a mass of aircraft easily salable on the world market. Old Soviet Bloc countries such as Belarus and the Ukraine have been selling aircraft off in reasonably large numbers through the whole 1990s. Think what Russia could achieve with a full line up-of respected airframes with Š truly Š modern combat capabilities, offered by companies which can really realize them?

And, talking about the Russians: what kinds of upgrades should Russia undertake? Their own needs could most likely be covered with radical minor changes, but it would decidedly be more economical to invest in new drastic upgrades. The range of future planes that Russia might like to see in service, such as the Su-35, do not need to be new airframes. Older Su-27 airframes will do very nicely; even Su-34s can be produced from old Su-27 airframes. Of course major structural modifications would be entailed in such a project. What Russia is currently faced with is not a need for new airframes but a need for new and advanced avionics. Russia can do quite well on upgrades. But unfortunately the money may not be forthcoming. Russian officials seem to grasp the economical sense of upgrades but lack the cash to put any into service. This cash could be raised however with foreign sales. If Belarus can sell old MiG-29s to Peru, Russia should be able to deliver MiG-21-93s to a host of countries. While massive Soviet aid packages may no longer exist, the recipients of those aid packages still do. Many countries are looking for new planes and balking at the price tag. Brazil springs to mind as a country more affluent than some countries that received Soviet gear (like Guinea Bissau for instance), yet the Brazilians have suffered serious problems with funding a new fighter, which all acknowledge they need! These little countries may prove to be like minute jackpots when offered a beautifully cheap alternative to new airframes. However, the Russians have to be careful. Some countries may not have the cash for an “Adder”-toting MiG-21-93 and would much rather prefer an upgrade which simply provides more ground attack capability. Tailoring to the individuals need should be a top priority.

With the above said I nevertheless feel that some of the right products are available right now. The MiG-21-93 is a sound upgrade that deserves more than just the Indian order. The MiG-29SMT might just have found some orders if the Russians had followed through with their promise of obtaining several. The MiG-23 upgrades seem to be some of the best ideas yet, providing either full multi-role fighters or small upgrades to the radar and systems to allow for modern AAMs like the R-77. Sukhoi seems more interested in promoting new variants of the same old thing, i.e. the Su-27, than upgrading. But again the majority of foreign users have MiGs. So even if the base for making good business is available, the results have been disappointing – it’s actually surprising to what degree.






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