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From ACIG.org Far-East Database
With an average elevation of 4.900 metres, Tibet is the highest region on earth and for this reason sometimes called “The Roof of the World”. It is also one of most isolated regions, surrounded by the Himalayas in the south (with some of the world’s highest summits) the Karakoram Range in the west, and the Kunlun Mountains in the north. Between the Kailas Range and the main chain is a river valley that extends about 1.000km. The Brahmaputra River flows from the west to east through most of this valley. The Kailas Range slopes north to the Tibetan Plateau: this vast tableland extends to the Karakoram Range in the west and the Kunlun Mountains in the north. Tibet has a dry, cold climate with very low average temperatures, especially cold in the mountains, and strong winds. The river valleys experience a more moderate climate. Vegetation is extremely spares, consisting mainly of grasses and shrubs. Scattered wooded areas occur in the extreme west and east. Tibet is rich in mineral resources, although only a few have been exploited due to inaccessibility and a lack of industrial capacity, as well as Buddhist admonitions against disturbing the earth for fear of harming living creatures. Gold, iron ore, coal, salt, and borax, oil shale, manganese, lead, zinc, quartz and graphite were found in several areas. Very few roads are available, and several run at altitudes over 5.000m. For most of its history, Tibet has maintained a national identity distinct from that of China, and was an independent country. At other times, it had various levels of association with China. Internal government was for centuries a theocracy, under the leadership of Buddhist lamas, or monks. In the first half of the 20th Century, Tibet was a weak state, with population in decline due to illness, poor health care and sizeable proportion of men becoming celibate monks. The vast majority of Tibetans lived in rural areas, many as nomads or semi-nomads. Lhasa, the capital and largest city, was – and remains – the principal centre of trade, commerce, education, and government, and the headquarters of major religious institutions. Majority of population were Tibetans, with a large minority of Han Chinese – China’s major ethnic group. In the 18th Century, Tibet came under the control of China, but its authority diminished through the 19th Century, when the British colonial officials in India attempted to secure a foothold in the region. These efforts proved unsuccessful, mainly because of the Tibetan resentment of an unsuccessful Nepalese invasion, in the 1790s, which the British had supported. British invaded Tibet in 1904, alarmed over purported Russian influence in the country. By the time, Tibet had considerable autonomy under Chinese authority. In 1906, however, the British and Chinese governments established an agreement by which the Britain recognized the Chinese Empire as Tibet’s suzerain power, in exchange for payment of a large indemnity to the British, who subsequently withdrew their troops. Following the revolutionary overthrow of China’s Qing dynasty, in 1911, Tibet became independent and began expelling all Chinese officials and troops from the region. In the same year, tentative agreement was reached between Britain, China and Tibet in regards of local borders. This agreement was never ratified by the Chinese, the subsequent governments of which refused to abandon their claims to all of Tibet. Relations between China and Tibet culminated in a war in eastern Tibet, in 1918, that ended through a British-negotiated truce. In October 1950, barely a year after the Communist Party had gained control of mainland China, and the People’s Republic of China was declared, the Communist troops invaded Qamdo (Chamdo), on Tibet’s eastern border. To rally the Tibetans against the advancing Chinese force, the regent, governor ruling for the 15-year-old 15th Dalai Lama, gave all the authority to the Dalai Lama. However, in May 1951, the Tibetan government was forced to capitulate, signing a treaty that gave the Dalai Lama power in domestic affairs, but ceded control of foreign and military affairs to the Chinese. Effectively, this so-called 17-Point Agreement incorporated Tibet into China as an autonomous province, but without for alteration of Tibetan political, cultural or religious systems and institutions. For the first few years a fiction of an agreement was maintained in Lhasa, but the outlying regions saw extensive collectivisation and the killing of tribal chiefs and lamas. As soon as the Communists completed their “Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”, and reached Lhasa, in October 1951, they began constructing airfields in various parts of the region, and military highways. A purge of anti-Chinese officials was carried out by 1953, and in the following year, the Indian government recognized Tibet as part of China, withdrawing its troops from two Tibetan trading posts. In 1955, India ceded to China its control of local telephone-, telegraph, and postal systems. In 1954, the young king Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, was appointed to a nominal position in the Chinese government, and two years later a committee was established to prepare a constitution for Tibet as an autonomous region of China. Meanwhile, however, guerrilla activity broke out in areas of Sichuan Province, after several influential Tibetan traders began to mobilize in a resistance movement that later became known as “Chushi Gandrug” (Four Rivers, Six Mountains). Their poorly-armed, rag-tag bands conducted a number of surprisingly successful raids in Kham, in eastern Tibet. The failure of the Chinese to uphold the 17-Point Agreement and the imposition of the so-called “democratic reform”, resulted in ever increasing number of fighters joining Chushi Gandrung and a popular revolt breaking out, in February 1956. Following a furious campaign, the rebels of Chushi Gandrug established control over significant parts of Kham. This forced the Chinese government to announce that the socialist transformation of the territory would be postponed. It was too late: encouraged by the Chinese inability to contain the rebellion, the rebels launched a series of attacks in towards the capital. The Chinese reacted with massive aerial bombardments of ancient monasteries at Chatreng and Litang, and a new military invasion that has left thousands killed. Desperate for outside support, groups close to the Tibetan leadership approached the USA – and the CIA for help. Although the US Administration was not interested in committing any significant resources to support the Tibetan independence, the CIA – frustrated from repeated and embarrassing failures while working with resistance groups behind communist lines (especially so in China) – became involved, launching the Operation “St Cirus”. At least for the time being, the prospects of a success of such an operation were relatively promising. However, what the Americans did was “too little, too late”: understanding that their capability to control Tibet were dependent on the supply situation, the Chinese were meanwhile working on developing the local net of roads and building additional airfields, increasing their military presence wherever possible. In the spring of 1957, the CIA flew the first six selected Khampa-fighters of Chushi Gandrung out to the island of Saipan, in Pacific. For the next six months, they were trained in modern weapons and guerrilla tactics, espionage and operating a hand-cranked radio station. One of the trainees was Gyato Wangdu, who would later become the last commander of Chushi Gandrug. After additional fighters were flown out and completed their training on Saipan, Operation “St Barnum” – infiltration of CIA-trained rebels back into Tibet began. The first two were parachuted into sand dunes near the Brahmaputra River, some 60km south of Lhasa, in October 1957. Equipped with a radio station, they were ordered to become the “eyes” of the CIA in Tibet, and establish contact to the armed opposition, as well as the young King. Like all the other outsiders, namely, the Americans knew very little about this territory: available maps were very few and full of white spots, communications to the outside world almost non-existing. Without surprise, in advance of insertion of the first group of CIA-trained fighters, on 21 August 1957, a Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane made a flight over Tibet, taking photographs and gathering considerable intelligence about an area that until then was barely known in detail. For these early covert infiltrations a rebuilt Boeing B-17 bomber was used – which at the time was the workhorse for covert China operations, mainly undertaken from Taiwan. The plane was devoid of all weapons and national markings, painted black and modified with engine mufflers to shield engine exhausts. Flown by an expatriate Polish crew, headed by Capt. Franciszek Czekalski, already with considerable experience from clandestine operations along – and well behind – Soviet borders, on the first flight into Tibet, the B-17 dropped only two out of six agents and a load consisting of two radio sets, some small arms and ammunition. The B-17 was based at Okinawa, but the first two infiltration flights were undertaken from Kurmitola airfield, in East Pakistan (today Bangladesh), and – without an official permission – over the Indian airspace, using the Himalayan massif as a radar screen. The second Tibetan team was dropped in November 1958, and soon linked with guerrilla. Initially, the US support had minimal effects on the war that raged through Tibet, and in which the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was meanwhile deploying at least two regiments of fighter-bombers to hit towns under guerrilla control. Exactly what types were deployed by the PLAAF in Tibet remains unknown, but various Tibetan sources indicate the use of Ilushin Il-10 fighter-bombers, Ilushin Il-28 and Tupolev Tu-4 bombers, as well as MiG-fighters (MiG-15s and MiG-17s). From few available reports, it is known that in October 1958, the Khampa guerrillas have shot down at least one Chinese aircraft on a bombing mission, and that this has had a crew of five, as well as a “turret with powerful machine guns” and internal bomb-carrying capability. This would indicate the use of some other type but the already mentioned. Certainly, the Il-28 was the preferred solution, then it had the range as well as good load capacity; but, it has never had a crew of five. In addition, the rebellion of Chushi Gandrug lacked support of Tibetan leadership: guided by a die-hard pacifist Dalai Lama, the citizens and refugees of Lhasa were not especially interested in provoking the Chinese, or in what was going on in distant Kham Province. In fact, the situation was not much different even in place where the US-trained Tibetans were welcome: after joining Gompo Tashi, the leader of Chushi Gandrug, two of these radioed requests for arms and ammunition. When none were forthcoming, the rebels launched a series of raids against local Chinese garrisons on their own. The CIA was reluctant to send weapons without understanding what was actually going on. Its ability to do so depended mainly on the capability of its agents in Tibet to overcome problems of translating Tibetan into English, and their grammatical shortcomings while using the Morse code. When communication became particularly problematic, one of the agents even had to travel to Calcutta in order to be de-briefed by CIA agents in situ. Eventually, in autumn 1958, the CIA brought a decision to provide material assistance to the NVDA. For the next series of supply- and insertion flights, a “sanitized” Douglas C-118A (military version of the DC-6) was used, bailed from the USAF and flown by CAT-crews. The first drop from the second series was undertaken in October 1958, the C-118A again flying from Kurmitola via Indian airspace. The plane delivered 200 vintage Lee-Enfield rifles and ammunition. The advantage of these ancient bolt-action weapons was obvious: it was used by the (small) National Tibetan Army already since 1914, but also by the Indian and Pakistani armies, and thus no link existed to the USA. Meanwhile, the Chushi Gandrug was working itself clockwise around Lhasa, ambushing small Chinese units and overrunning few outposts. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China countered by deploying spotter planes and field artillery, and eventually delivered a defeat on the rebels when these attempted to concentrate for an attack against the Damshung airfield, north of Lhasa. With increasing aid from the CIA, in early 1959, Gompo Tashi reorganized his force and launched several large-scale attacks, none of which produced a major victory, even if causing extensive losses to the PLA. Chushi Gandrug meanwhile became the Tensung Dhanglang Magar (Voluntary Force for the Defence of Buddhism), and then the National Volunteer Defense Army (NVDA), in order to show its pan-Tibetan character. One early problem the rebels encountered was the Chinese air power: whenever the PLAAF aircraft were able to detect rebel concentrations, the later were subjected to fierce air strikes and suffer badly. Lacking anti-aircraft weapons, and operating mainly in the open, the Tibetans proved exceptionally vulnerable to air power, and their losses were heavy. Aside from the Chinese air power, the NVDA was suffering from disunity between various clans and lack of modern means of communication, which prevented it from properly coordinating actions of various groups. Meanwhile, the situation in Lhasa was reaching the boiling point, the Communist authorities losing patience with the Dalai Lama. When it became clear that the Chinese were about to eliminate the young king, on 10 March 1959, a large crowd surrounded his residence to protect him. Before too long, the mass called for the Chinese to leave. The Dalai Lama was smuggled out of his residence, seven days later, and – escorted by two CIA-trained fighters – brought to the Indian border. Unaware of his escape, on 20 March 1959, the citizens of Lhasa rioted. Simultaneously, the Tibetan Army attempted to seize strategic points around the capital. The crackdown was harsh: responding in kind, the Chinese began shelling the palace and then the city. Within four days, with hundreds of civilians killed, the rebels were forced to leave the capital. When news about the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India surfaced, the Chinese reacted with unbelievable brutality against the population of Lhasa, killing, arresting, or deporting to labour camps an estimated 87.000 Tibetans. The NVDA was not sitting idle: on 25 December 1959, it launched attacks against a number of Chinese bases and outposts. According to contemporary reports in Chinese newspapers, In 15 days of fighting the rebels killed more than 550 Chinese soldiers, in exchange for 20 killed and nine injured. Additional attacks were launched in January 1959, causing massive losses to the Chinese army as the local population joined the rebels. The destruction of the Chinese Army units in eastern Tibet was almost complete when the weather cleared, enabling the PLAAF to become involved. The PLAAF launched a massive campaign of indiscriminate attacks by fighter-bombers and bombers, resulting in immense destruction and civilian casualties. By April, when the CIA was about to make another drop, the rebellion inside Tibet was on the verge of collapse under a two-prong Chinese advance. The next contingent of Tibetans trained in the USA could not be deployed; nevertheless, two new groups of trainees were recruited from around 6.000 of Tibetan refugees that streamed into India. The new Chinese advance into Tibet was well organized and had a very strong logistical support, as well as ample support from the PLAAF. For some time, the topic of interdicting these communications by US air power was discussed in Washington, until a solution was found in training and deploying CIA’s Tibetan trainees to operate along the only three roads that were existent in Tibet at the time. The next infiltration was undertaken after two additional U-2 overflights of Tibet and China, on 12 and 14 May 1959. Days later, the C-118 – this time flown by a US crew – headed for Kurmitola. A team of four ethnic Hiu was dropped, together with a load of arms, ammunition and supplies, in Amdo, some 160km east of Koko Nor. The agents soon connected with local rebels, and a month later another drop was made, again from the same C-118. This operation, code-named “St Whale”, was not as lucky, however. Soon after landing all agents were captured by the Chinese. No additional drops of Hiu or in this area were made. The CIA increased the number of Tibetans on training in Camp Hale, and began recruiting flying crews for additional clandestine operations. All through 1959, pilots, co-pilots, loaders and parachutists were gathered in Washington D.C. Based in Thailand, “sanitized” USAF C-130As of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron from Naha AB, in Okinawa, flown by Air America crews, continued the Operation St Barnum. For each mission, a C-130A was flown from Naha to Kadena, Okinawa, where it would take CIA agents. These would then be flown to Takhli AB, in Thailand; the aircraft was stripped of all military markings and then loaded with supplies. Tibet was reached via Burma, the crews using call-signs “Able Flight” or “Baker Flight” for recognition. The number of flights into Tibet was increased, resulting in drops of not only M1 Garand rifles, but also mortars, grenades, recoilless rifles and machine guns. The first drop in 1959, still undertaken by a C-118A, consisted of 126 pallets of cargo, including 370 M1 rifles (with 192 rounds per rifle), four machine guns and two radio sets. The third drop already consisted of 226 pallets, with more than 800 rifles, 200 cases of ammunition and 20 cases of grenades. C-130As from 21st TCS are known to have flown drops on 18 September 1958, in the second week of November 1959, and in mid-December 1959. Largest drops were undertaken during the winter 1960. On 6 January and in mid-February, two C-130As delivered 650 pallets loaded not only with arms, but also food and medicine. From mid-March 1960, two C-130s were deployed for each mission, and in April 1960 two Hercules flew missions on two consecutive nights. Overconfident after their immense success and due to US support, however, the Tibetans made a massive mistake, concentrating most of their fighters – together with their families and a mass of refugees – in a huge camp at Chagra Pembar. It did not take long until this was found by the PLAAF. In a days-long offensive, the Chinese bombers flew rolling attacks, killing thousands of men, women, children and animals. Artillery barrages then toped off the aerial bombings. Very few rebels survived this massacre and subsequent attack by the Chinese Army. The disaster increased when the Chinese attacked the other gathering site, at Nira Tsogeng, in a similar manner, where 4.000 rebels gathered, reinforced by a drop of 430 pallets of weapons and other supplies from the CIA. The survivors fled to the desolate plain of Ladakh, where most died for lack of water in the following weeks. In the spring of 1960, another seven-man team was dropped by the CIA into Markam, in eastern Tibet. Although landing safely and managing to join the local rebel force, this group was soon surrounded by a much larger unit of the Chinese army, and destroyed. By the end of May, out of 49 Tibetans dropped, only 12 were still alive – with two of them already in Chinese prisons. The rebellion was doomed to failure also because Tibet could barely support even its own population, not to talk about mobile guerrilla forces. Communication problems remained immense as well: the radios supplied by the CIA required too many batteries and the rebels preferred deliveries of arms instead of the later. By the summer of 1960, the rebels had to move their bases outside Tibet, into neighbouring Nepal. The CIA planned to gather some 2.100 fighters in the area called Mustang, re-train and send them back into Tibet in groups of 300. Within a relatively short period of time, the first 300 fighters were gathered under command of an ex-monk, named Bapa Gen Yeshe. Due to poor security, however, this enterprise was betrayed. Upset by the security breach, and heeding Eisenhower’s proscription against provocative airdrops in the wake of the downing of CIA’s U-2, flown by Gary Powers, over the USSR, the US support was withdrawn. The CIA’s C-130-operations were suspended and most of the crews subsequently continued their service with Air America, Intermountain Aviation and similar companies, in South-East Asia. While some of Tibetan rebel groups penetrated deep into China, where they photographed various sensitive military sites, make maps and locate additional potential drop zones, thus helping the USA to learn about Chinese missile programs and efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the support from Washington was now minimal. In fact, after repeated attempts, Tibetan operatives even managed to plant sensors near the testing groups at Lop Nor, which gave Washington its earliest clues on China’s first nuclear test conducted there in 1964. In total, CIA’s transports did 40 flights over Tibet in 1960 and 1961, and at least one in 1962. The first 30-35 drops were an immense logistical success: they boasted the morale of Tibetan fighters, and supplied them with equipment needed to gain considerable victories against the Chinese. Subsequent drops, however, brought only false hope and were largely futile. On average, between 6 and 15 Tibetan fighters were dropped on each flight, together with few tons of supplies. Because of operating at the extreme limit of their endurance, aircraft had to carry extra fuel in a tank mounted inside the cargo hold. All flights were undertaken in complete radio silence, and by night. After approaching the drop zone at a level of 32.000ft, the aircraft would drop down to 15.000ft, get the troops out first, and then return to drop weapons and food. The decision to stop supporting the Tibetans in autumn 1960, resulted in terrible suffering in all Mustang camps during the following winter, with dozens of Tibetans frozen to death. Eventually, money was provided for food, and Tibetan hopes remained high, especially since the spring of 1961 brought a new US President and with him also hopes for continued support. The second Tibetan C-130-airlift was launched on 31 March 1961, using a single C-130A of the E-Detachment 21st TCS, then stationed at Takhli AB. Additional drops are known to have been undertaken by two Hercules’ on 2 April 1961 (again to Mustang), and in mid-December 1961. Reinforced by new weapons and supplies, the rebels launched a series of attacks along the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, causing the Chinese to completely give up its use and build another road farther away. In one of the attacks, the main intelligence coup was achieved, when the Tibetans captured a Chinese female high-ranking officer, together with a sack full of documents. These provided hard evidence of the failure of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward”, famine, and discontent within the PLA. Despite this and other successes, the US aid now served no serious purpose any more. By 1962, the Chinese have built a number of roads and airstrips, establishing strong lines of communications, which enabled them to deploy a large number of Army and PLAAF units in Tibet. These launched a campaign of terror, systematically destroying ancient monasteries and temples, killing thousands of civilians, and imposing an economic blockade that resulted in famine. By 1976, an estimated 1.200.000 Tibetans were killed or died of starvation, and more than 6.000 religious sites were destroyed. International calls for Chinese to stop repression were in vain: the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, calling on Beijing to ensure respect for fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life, and to cease practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to self-determination. Occurring at the time when the UN was preventing Chinese Communists from membership in the organization, these resolutions were of no importance for the regime in Beijing. Tens of thousands of Tibetans fled Tibet, mainly setting in India. Others took refuge in the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan. Meanwhile, in 1962, what was left of the CIA’s Tibetan program was reorganized as to include the cooperation with India. Indian involvement in Tibet can be tracked back to the first half of the 1950s. Indian tycoon Biju Patnaik is known to have clandestinely provided the aircraft of his Kalinga Airlines to the Indian military already when this was forced to establish an air bridge to Srinagar, during the Kashmir War, back in 1948. The same planes were used for assistance of the young Indonesian Republic, during its struggle for independence, in the following years. Officially, Kalinga Airlines was merged with seven other airlines to form Air India, in 1953. However, there are records about a crash of Kalinga Airlines’ C-47 “VT-AZX” over Nepal, in 1955. While – on the first look – this aircraft might have been involved in some kind of clandestine operations, it should be mentioned that Patnaik’s companies were some of the first to obtain licences for making regular commercial flights to Nepal and then Tibet, as well as that Patnaik was involved in supporting the “Nepalese Democratic Movement”, in the 1950s. Nevertheless, Patnaik remained an adventurist and private entrepreneur, ready to provide his assets to the Indian government, and was later highly influential in establishing contacts between US and Indian authorities. These resulted in the CIA and the Indian Intelligence Bureau joining their efforts to support the insurgency in Tibet, in the early 1960s. Air Ventures Inc., a front company of the CIA, was set up in Nepal, in autumn 1963, to operate two C-46Ds and four U-18 Helio Couriers given to the Indian Aviation Research Center (ARC). The later was a front company of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, set to coordinate cooperation with the CIA from Charbatia AB, in India, for covert supply drops. To support this operation, a team of eight Indian Air Force officers – led by Col. Laloo Grewal, a highly experienced fighter- and transport-pilot – was secretly trained in the USA, at Camp Peary, on intelligence and paramilitary topics, as well as aviation instruction, while Air America loaned some of its best pilots to act as instructors to ARC personnel. The ARC began operations over Nepal in 1964, yet never provided more but scant support for insurgents in Tibet, as immense pressure from China forced Indians to stop supporting US clandestine operations. Subsequent US administrations – partially due to Indian and Nepalese pressure – have lost interest in supporting the insurgency. Correspondingly, the rebels were instructed to cease combat operations and instead concentrate on intelligence gathering. The Tibetans continued raiding into China well into the late 1960s, nevertheless, and the CIA continued dropping arms and supplies until May 1965. In September 1964, however, Gompo Tashi died, and with him the unity of Tibetan rebel groups disappeared. Although small scale operations were continued into the 1970s, differences between various tribal leaders, mismanagement of funds and supplies, as well as terror of refugees in Nepal prevented any kind of significant success. The US rapprochement with China, in 1974, resulted in the order the ST Cirus to stand down. In the same year, under tremendous pressure from China, Nepalese Army shut down the camps in Mustang. The Dalai Lama then ordered his fighters to lay down their arms. Terribly disappointed, not few fighters committed suicide. The Tibetan uprising against the Chinese rule, which at times saw involvement of up to 14.000 insurgents and ten times more Chinese troops, thus went down as a victim of “higher interests” of politicians in Washington. According to various accounts, over 90.000 Tibetans were killed during the uprising in the late 1950s and through 1960s, and more than one million were re-settled, imprisoned, or forced into exile. It should be born in mind, however, that right from the start the US support was insufficient to gain any lasting results then it came too late, well after the Chinese established a firm grip of Tibet. - The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, by Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, - The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, by Joe Bageant, Military History Magazine, February 2004 - The Aircraft of Air America, by Dr. Joe F. Leeker, website of University of Texas, Dallas, June 2004
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