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From ACIG.org ACIG Database
Ecuador bought 16 F.1AJs and two F.1JEs in 1980, and these saw their first air combat already in the same year, when two F.1AJs clashed with two Peruvian Su-22s. One R.550 was launched but it missed. Subsequently, in February 1995, the same types clashed again, this time with F.1AJs downing two Sukhois (or - according to other sources - a Su-22 and an A/37B).
Meanwhile, Ecuatorean F.1s were adapted to carry Israeli-made Python Mk.III air-to-air missiles, and these are usually mounted on the outer underwing pylons, the wing-tip launch rails remaining "reserved" for R.550 Magics. France purchased over 400 Mirage F.1s, of which the F.1C-200s and F.1CRs flew numerous combat missions in Chad and during the IIPGW. Since the early 1990s most of the survivors were brought to the F.1CT standard, which is essentially similar to the F.1EQ-4, sold to Iraq in the mid-1980s. (by Nicholas Tselepidis) In June 1967 many things changed in the way air wars were conducted worldwide. One of these changes was that a non-US fighter achieving a great combat record that made it famous all over the world: the Dassault Mirage III. As Staff Officers in different parts of the globe started to study the Six Day War, a few kilometres on the northwest of the battlefield, another crisis was starting to develop. On September 9, 1967 the then Turkish Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel stated "Any action against the peace and safety of our community in Cyprus will find Turkey opposed". Obviously the Turkish Generals thought the Greek Colonels and their Junta in the Athens were 'easy prey'. Rauf Denktash is being arrested by a 1st Higher Command patrol after coming ashore at night in a Turkish SF operation North of Famagusta, on Cyprus, on the night of the 31st of October and the tension between Greece and Turkey rapidly rose. St. Michael's day, November 8 1967, is the traditional open day for all Greek Air Force (Polemiki Aeroporia - shortened: "(E)PA") bases. Fighter aircraft are dispersed in all bases and the families and aviation enthusiasts visit them. That day at 10:30h for the FIRST time after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Turkish fighters in battle formations flew east over the Greek National Airspace from Samothrace to Rhodes! The then 28ATAF CO, Air Vice Marshall I. Anagnostopoulos after notifying the PA leadership and failing to reach 6ATAF CO Lt. Gen. Tipton, finally broke through the Airsouth CO in Naples and gave him 12 hours to recall the Turkish fighters. After that limit PA interceptors would be sent with orders to implement ROEs as per international law. Since that time THK fighters did not attempt such a massive move - that is, until July 1974. There were sporadic violations, especially from THK fighters that returned to Turkey from Squadron Exchanges with Greek Squadrons during 1973 and early 1974 however, without any political consequences. This mini crisis showed to PA the vulnerability of its spare parts supply: any time the US wanted to cut the readiness factor of PA QRA aircraft, it would find excuses like "port worker strikes" to cause delays of - for example - tyres and JATO rockets for PA F-84's. This is exactly what happened in November 1967 and prompted 28th ATAF Chief of Operations, then Brigadier Edmund Laitmer, to request from the then dictator-Prime Minister - and Minister of Defence - G. Papadopoulos to buy a non-US fighter aircraft for the PA to be able to maintain a level of readiness without having to think about political implications. The Mirage III was suggested at that meeting. In the summer of 1968, the PA sent 4 officers (Brigadier Laitmer, and Lt. Cols - as per NATO terminology - I. Hantziris (F-5A and F-86D pilot), and E. Tsamousopoulos (F-84 and F-104G pilot) plus one mechanics) to evaluate the MirageIIIB. From July 2 until July 4, the Dassault invited them from Merignac to Istres were they flew the brand new Mirage IIIRD (s/n 304). For pilots having flown and taught according to the USAF manuals and procedures, this was a surprise, nevertheless, already during the second flight with the one-seater a combat profile was flown! A second PA detachment went to France in 1971 in order to evaluate this time the brand-new Mirage F.1. The 335 CO E. Kampiotis (an F-84/86/104G pilot and trained at Nellis AFB, in the USA, as an F-4C Instructor in 1966-67) and later PA chief of staff and Undersecretary of Defence, N. Kouris both flew the Mirage F.1-03 after only one day of ground school, with emphasis on the emergency procedures. The "-1 manual" was a mixture of handwritten notes in French and English, written by Dassault's test pilots and the cockpit panel was of course written in French. After the Nixon administration had lifted the arms embargo, in 1972, the Greek administration opted for the F-4E instead, because it was two-seater and had better range than the F.1. Even after Dassault offered a 20% participation and a production line in Greece in order to secure the deal the PA chose to go American by ordering F-4E's A-7H's and C-130's instead. This was a major step for PA and meant that money should be spent not only in purchasing a/c but also in training personnel, building infrastructure (runways, taxiways, hangars, depots etc.) and keeping the current mission under NATO and National operational requirements. Negotiations restarted in early 1974, but by then the co-production deal was gone and the aircraft had to be paid in cash with no loans or other FMS-like procedures. On 16 June 1974 the contract for 40 Mirage F.1CG.s was signed and the deliveries were scheduled to last from 1977 until 1979. The invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, in July 1974, changed many things in Greece. First of all was the fall of the military dictatorship and the return of free democratic rule. In military matters, the "Warsaw Pact Dogma" that the Greek Armed Forces used in their training and contingency plans was replaced by the threat from the East - the Turkey. This meant that the F.1CG's were crucial to the PA planning and so after a personal request from then Greek PM C. Karamanlis to his close friend the French President V.G D'Estaign, Dassault initiated deliveries of the new interceptors already on 5 August 1975, by diverting aircraft destined for the French Air Force to Greece: on that day, Major Alexander Mamais landed F.1CG "101" at Tanagra. Greece thus became the first export customer for the type. The Greek F.1CGs entered service with the 342 Mira, which at the time was still using the F-102A Delta Dart as an all-weather interceptor. The last Delta Daggers in PA service would be retired in 1977 when all 40 F.1CGs were delivered. Unfortunately the PA Staff did not buy any of the French AA missiles to equip the new fighters and so these had to be armed with US-supplied AIM-9Js instead. In 1984 the KETA (Center for Research and Aviation Technology) stared to develop the wiring for the 2 outboard underwing pylons, in order to make F.1Cgs able to carry 4 AAM instead of 2. This happened with Dassault's help by 1985 and ever since the PA Mirage tooth four AIM-9P-2. The French trained the Greek pilots in horizontal interceptions, using the medium range Matra 530's, but the Greek pilots were much more used to WVR tactics and procedures. On the other side of the Aegean Turkey had bought 40 F-104S's from Italy in order to use them as interceptors, but these were never armed with anything else than Sidewinders over the Aegean, despite Italian claims that the Sparrow could be carried also. So the balance in armament between Greece and Turkey regarding their specialized interceptors was there, albeit the Greek F.1CG's were much more maneuverable and flexible in operations than the Starfighters. The only part of the flight envelope that the Starfighter was better was the climb rate. In fact the Mirage F.1CG's had better sustained and instantaneous turn ratio than any THK or PA fighter in service, until the arrival of the F-16 - this was an exceptionally important point in a situation where the PA and the THK were encountering each other almost on a daily basis in mock-up dogfights over the Aegean Sea. Considering the small size and the slim silhouette, as well as the smoke-less engine of the F.1CG, and then the Cyrano IV radar that could track targets in realistic interception conditions over the Aegean at 45-50 miles out, the Mirage 'supremacy' became legendary already at the time. The type was considered by PA pilots an honour to be chosen to train on and fly, and until 1982 only the most experienced fliers were transferred to the two units serving with it, the 342 or 334 Mira.
After that year also pilots fresh out from the "Sholi Ikaron" (the HAF Academy) - and thus having only previous training on T-2 Buckeyes - were accepted to fly the F.1CGs, all of which were single-seaters. However, any such candidate has got exhaustive simulator training, so that his instructors could be 1000% sure that the student was able to fly the aircraft in all conceivable scenarios before clearing him for his first - solo - flight with the Mirage. One anecdote of the first night interception of a THK a/c by a PA Mirage F.1CG is well known: when the Greek pilot came close from the THK F-4E's 4 o'clock position and turned on the interception light, the THK Phantom pilot was recorded yelling in the emergency frequency "UFO, UFO!".
The Mirage F.1CG proved to be a very solid and safe aircraft to fly and operate. Ever since 1989, when 334 Mira moved to Heraklion AB, where the runway and shelters are a few meters from the sea, there has never been a structural or corrosion problem - contrary to the aircraft supplied from the USA. Together with arduous efforts of the maintenance personnel and the Hellenic Aerospace LTD., where general overhauls are performed, this helped the type to be held for hours on QRA in the hangar and still have a good turnout rate for any kind of missions. After 1990 the F.1CG was used against THK F-16s in interceptions and during one of these - on 18th of June 1992 - Lt. Sialmas was killed when his a/c stalled and crashed on the Aegean while chasing an F-16. This was the only - definitively confirmed - loss of a PA F.1CG during an interception of Turkish fighters, although there are serious rumours about another being shot down by THK F-16s some times later. In exchange on 8th of February 1995 a THK F-16 crashed near Rhodes as it was returning home after being intercepted by F.1CG's: the official cause was stated to have been the pilot which supposedly, "forgot to switch the engine feed from the drop tanks to the main fuel tanks". The THK flier was then rescued by a 358 Mira AB.205A-1 and was flown to Rhodes Hospital before being flown by the same SAR Huey from Rhodes back to Turkey. After the arrival of more modern types in PA service, the Mirage E.1CG's started to become secondary in PA planning and air operations. In 2000 344 Mira disbanded and all it’s aircraft and personnel passed on to 342 Mira. After almost 28 years of service, on 30 June 2003 the remaining 24 F.1CG's were retired at Tanagra AB. The Mirage F,1CG's were influentia1 in another way as well. Their "Mirage bleu" or "Aegean Blue" colour scheme (consisting of FS 35164 applied to upper surfaces, and silver-grey on lower surfaces) proved to be very effective over the Aegean, so in the early 80's all PA a/c that were tasked with interception duties were painted in the same colour. In early 2001 two F.1CGs were painted in the "Ghost" scheme and this proved very effective as well, but it came too late in their career to be applied in all of the surviving aircraft. In total, the PA logged no less but 160.000+ flying hours with its F.1CGs, which means 5500-6000 per airframe - and many of these - over 3.500+ hours - in "live" interceptions over the Aegean Sea, under combat-similar conditions. This article is dedicated to those who gave their blood in order to protect our freedom.
Notes: 1) Information about the PA's evaluation of Mirage F.1CGs came from article by D. Stergiou, in the Cockpit magazine, volume July 2003; 2) HUD photo of the THK F-16 is courtesy 342 Mira 3) Photograph of the AIM-9P Sidewinder is courtesy of 342 Mira via Savvas Vlassis. Iran acquired 24 Mirage F.1EQ/BQs when these were flown by defecting Iraqi pilots to Iranian airfields, in January and February 1991 - together with three plane-loads of spare parts and weapons. By 1993 all were introduced in service with the IRIAF, and based at TFB.14, Mashhad, in eastern Iran. Iranian Mirage F.1EQs were used extensively in the fighting against Afghani and Pakistani drug-smuggling bands, as well as against Taliban - inside southern Afghanistan.
Iraq was the largest export customer, acquiring a total of 32 F.1EQ/EQ/2s, 28 F.1EQ-4s, 20 F.1EQ-5s, 18 F.1EQ-6s, and six F.1EQ-7s, as well as 20 two-seaters (which were used in combat as well).
They saw extensive service during the war with Iran, mainly being used as interceptors, but also as fighter-bombers and for anti-ship tasks.
Kuwait purchased 18 F.1CKs, two F.1BKs, and nine F.1CK/2s, of which no less but eight were lost in different mishaps during the 1980s, and at least two destroyed in Iraqi air and artillery attacks on 2 August 1990, while six others were captured and taken to Iraq. Nevertheless, the 15 survivors took off to fight and shot down several Iraqi helicopters - before escaping to to Saudi Arabia, from where they were to fight the other day, in the IIPGW.
Libya was one of the first export customers for Mirage F.1s, having placed the first order for 38 airframes already in 1974. The first Libyan order was for 16 F.1ADs, a specialized strike-variant, lacking the radar but having a retractable fuel probe mounted instead. These were delivered between January 1978 and April 1978 to the 1011th Fighter Squadron, based at Okhba Ibn-Nafi AB, and serialled 401 thru 416. Together with F.1ADs, also six F.1BD two-seaters were delivered between April 1978 and October 1979, serialled 201 thru 206.
The third Libyan order was for 16 Mirage F.1ED interceptors, equipped with the Cyrano IV-I radar. These were delivered to the 1012th Fighter Squadron between January 1978 and October 1979, also based at Okhba Ibn-Nafi AB, and serialled 501 thru 516.
The Libyans have ordered also huge amounts of spare parts for their Mirages, which enabled them to keep these operational until today: several independent reports confirmed that the LARAF was highly satisfied with Mirage F.1s and was also taking care about them much better than about Soviet-supplied MiGs and Sukhois.
Except with 30mm DEFA guns, Libyan Mirage F.1EDs were armed with R.550 Magic Mk.1s and R.530FEs: no reports are known about any supplies of subsequent Super 530s to LARAF. Aside from SAMP 250 and 400 bombs, however, for F.1ADs the French supplied also a number of advanced Beluga CBUs, even if no PGMs are known to have been sold to Libya. Flown by Libyan, Pakistani (1981-1983) and Palestinian ("Force-14") pilots, Libyan Mirage F.1s participated in the war in Chad intensively. From 1981 a detachment from each unit was deployed at Marten es-Serra AB, in southern Libya, and from 1983 they were regularly detached also to Faya-Largeau, in central northern Chad. Together with older Mirage 5s, LARAF F.1s were instrumental in the huge success the service enjoyed during different campaigns against the Chadian troops in the early 1980s: operating over the open and barren desert terrain, they caused heavy damage to the enemy, making any larger troop movements very costly, for no losses in exchange Morocco bought 30 F.1CHs, 14 F.1EHs, and six F.1EH-200s (equipped with IFR-probes) and used these extensively during the war in West Sahara.
12 Qatari F.1EDAs and two F.1DDAs were used during the IIPGW, when they flew many missions together with F-16Cs from the 401st TFW USAF. Sadly, not much about their operations at the time is known. South Africans bought 32 FG.1AZs and 16 F.1CZs, and these were also extensively used during the war in Angola, where they scored (at least) two kills against MiG-21s.
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