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Western & Northern Africa Database
The Results of El Dorado Canyon
Several hours after the US strike against Tripolis, in the night from 14 to 15 April 1986, Col. Khadaffi appeared for the first time to issue his public response to the US attack against Tripolis to a crowd gathering at the Bab al-Azizya barracks in Tripoli. „We humiliated America and ist fores“, he boasted, continuing that his „Line of Death repelled the US 6th Fleet in the Gulf of Sirte“. Ghadaffi went on to claim that his missiles had shot down three American warplanes, „whose six pilots are now feeding the fish“. He maintained that his forces had recovered a dud missile fired by the Americans: „We are going to hand it over to the Russians“, he goated, and then went on to dismiss President Reagan as „a trivial and futile actor“, bragging that „America fears Libya.
Meanwhile, the US forces were about to start collect post-strike intelligence. Between 01:30 and 03:20, a total of three KC-135Qs and two KC-10As started from Mildenhall, in order to support one SR-71, which started at 04:00, and other which followed around 05:15hrs (this was the first time that two Black Birds were to fly a joint mission).
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| In the weeks and months before and after the US strikes againt Tripolis and Benghazi the F/A-18s from the USS Coral Sea intercepted several Libyan fighters again, including this MiG-23MS, "escorted" by Maj. D. R. "Zoric" Reb, an USAF exchange pilot with VFA-131. (USAF) |
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| An "ironic" formation: the LARAF Su-22M-2K, actually a fighter-bomber but here armed with K-13s and acting as an interceptor, was intercepted by an F/A-18A of the VFA-132 "Privateers", which is armed with Mk.7 Rockeye cluster bombs! (USN) |
Both SR-71As thundered over Tripolis and Benghazi, and these are probably "3rd" and "4th" "attacks" later reported by Libyans and Soviets. But, strangely, neither Tripoli nor Moscow reported anything about "additional attacks" flown again on 16 and 17 April, because earlier SR-71-missions were spoiled by the bad weather.... Also, neither of the two sides reported intensive SAR-operations by USN helicopters - escorted by F-14s and F/A-18s - during the following three days, for the crew of the lost F-111F. Recce-photos shot by SR-71s showed a destruction of six Il-76s, one Boeing 737 and one G.222 at Tripolis, together with between four and 16 MiG-23s, two F.27s and two Mi-8s at Benina. In total, Prairie Fire and El Dorado Canyon costed the Libyans the mentioned barracks, SAM-sites, ships, and aircraft, at - possibly - one USAF F-111F shot down (not three or five on 24 March, and certainly not "20" on 14/15 April, as widely claimed by the Libyan media at the time, and sometimes repeated by certain Russian sources).
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| The wreck of a Mi-8 belonging to the Libyan Arab Army and completely destroyed during US attacks against the Benina AB, near Benghazi, can be seen here in the foreground, with another example - apparently intact - standing behind. (via Tom Cooper) |
For the USAF, the operation was a technical success, and an immensely important lection, used very much in 1991 - what else can one say about tactical fighters, flown by crews without any previous combat experience, delivering PGMs during a 9.500km retour-trip. But, the strike was very much overshadowed by the loss of one plane, technical problems suffered by several aircraft (despite this, four aircraft which scored hits in Tripoli have done their job properly), and fierce international reactions, which in part - without any reason, and lacking the full knowledge about the backgrounds - as we now know - attacked the USA (even if the US administration at the time certainly failed to explain its behavior in full to the public).
For the Soviets the strike again Libya should have not came as a surprise. Not only that they have been warning the Libyans that the US would strike, but also - regardless of the security surrounding the USAF-part of the operation, it is pretty certain that the Soviets have noticed that something is going on: after all, it is almost impossible to fly a formation of 22 F-111s over a distance of almost 4.000kms, and refuel it four times in the air from numerous KC-135s and KC-10s without revealing at least some traces. At least the few Soviet warships that operated in the area - including at least one Sovremeniy-class destroyer - must have noticed the large formation approaching Libya from the north. Yet, the Soviets have not taken care to warn the Libyan regime. On the contrary.
Even more so, their reports about the US strike were at least as strange. The website of the "Parallel History Project" about the Cold War between the NATO and Warsaw Pact:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/ has published a translation of a report by Soviet Air Force Marshall Koldunov - at the time the top Soviet military adviser in Libya - about the US attack against Libya in 1986, and this is full of very curious remarks. The original translation from German (the version of this report was found in Eastern Germany) was prepared by Grace Leonard, and can be found here:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_5/docs/Lybia_engl.htm
Secret – Classified Material!
[stamp:] BStU
GVS-No. : A 456 721
16
Copy 5, 6 pages
EIGVS 819186 [illeg., possibly initials]
Information
from Air Force Marshall Koldunov
on issues related to
“US aggression against LIBYA”
---------------------------------------------------------
Air Force Marshall Koldunov reported that it was not until 20 April 1986 that a group of Soviet specialists were permitted to travel to LIBYA to study on-site the US acts of aggression and the countermeasures taken by the Libyan military.
Currently the only information available is from the Soviet specialists who were employed in the Libyan military air defense units.
LIBYA has acquired a great deal of modern technology from the Soviet Union, including:
- 4 “VEGA” anti-aircraft missile units units = 24 launch pad
and
- 86 “VOLCHOV” and “NEVA” anti-aircraft missile units = 276 launch pads.
Thus, LIBYA’s air defense alone has more than 300 launch pads for various anti-aircraft missile systems.
In addition, there are a large number of Soviet “KUB” and “OSA-AK” anti-aircraft missiles systems and French “CROTALE II” anti-aircraft missile systems in the LIBYAN ground forces.
The following air defenses cover TRIPOLI, the capital:
- 7 “VOLCHOV” anti-aircraft missile units = 42 launch pads
- 12 “NEVA” anti-aircraft missile units
= 48 launch pads
- 3 “KUB” anti-aircraft missile units = 48 launch pads
- 1 “OSA-AK” anti-aircraft regiment = 16 launch pads
- 2 “CROTALE II” anti-aircraft units = 60 launch pads
Secret – Classified Material!
[stamp:] BStU
GVS-No. A 456 721 Copy 5 page 2
17
These air defense forces, which include more than 200 launch pads, are more than enough to provide assured protection for the capital against air attacks.
On the aggressive acts at the end of March
American aircraft operating from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean were testing LIBYA’s air defenses as early as the end of March.
A first group of three aircraft flew into Libyan airspace from the sea at about 1200 on 24 March 1986.
Qadhaffi then ordered that the “VEGA” anti-aircraft missile system be used. Two missiles were launched against the target at a range of 105 km and the target disappeared from the monitor.
The American search and rescue helicopters employed immediately thereafter proved that the target had been destroyed.
The approach of a second group of two aircraft was detected in the evening at about 1800.
The target was destroyed with one launched missile at a range of 75 km.
The Libyans therefore claimed that they had shot down a total of five aircraft.
After more precise analysis and more objective examination, Soviet specialists determined that three aircraft had been shot down.
President Reagan said that there had been no losses.
On the aggression on 15 April 1986
The Soviet Union reported as early as 13 April 1986 that a possible air attack on LIBYA was imminent based on the concentration of the carrier group in the Mediterranean and on other intelligence information.
The Libyans were encouraged to declare “heightened combat readiness” for its military and “full combat readiness” for national air defense forces and resources. Qadhaffi and the leadership of the Libyan army did not take this warning seriously and did not respond to it.
Secret – Classified Material!
[stamp:] BStU
GVS-No. : A 456 721 Copy 5 page 3
18
F-111 fighter bombers flying out of ENGLAND conducted the 1st air attack at 0335 on 15 April 1986.
The air attack on the capital of TRIPOLI did not come from the sea, that is, it did not come from the MeEDITERRANEAN, but from the south across the desert at an altitude of approx. 50 m.
At the same time, aircraft carriers operating in the MEDITERRANEAN launched a large number of unmanned aircraft (drones), which threw Libyan radar reconnaissance into an extremely difficult position.
After the unmanned aircraft were employed, the fighter bombers took off from the aircraft carriers at an altitude of 50 to 70 m while heavy radar jamming was employed.
The first strikes were directed entirely at the air defense system, especially radar stations and “VEGA” anti-aircraft missile control centers.
The 2nd air attack occurred at 0400 against TRIPOLI and BENGASI. At this time the air defense system had already acted, but with poor results.
The 3rd air attack occurred at 1600 and the 4th air attack occurred on 16 April 1986. Libya claims that a total of 20 aircraft were shot down during the last two attacks.
However, objective examination by Soviet specialists determined that a total of only 10 aircraft were shot down.
A few of these crashed into the ground, but most of the aircraft went down over the MEDITERRANEAN.
It was very difficult to use the “VEGA” anti-aircraft system during these attacks because the aircraft approached at very low altitudes (50 m). Qadhaffi ordered that the fighters not be used, he prohibited them from taking off; these aircraft include more than 300 fighters, of which 80 alone are MiG-25s.
The attitude on Soviet technology is characterized in that, for instance, all French “Mirage” aircraft are always carefully covered and maintained. On the other hand, the modern Soviet MiG-25 aircraft are continuously exposed to inclement weather, which has a negative impact on their continuous combat readiness under actual meteorological conditions.
Secret – Classified Material!
[stamp:] BStU
GVS-No. : A 456 721 Copy 5 page 4 19
The American aviation forces used a great number of “HARM” anti-radiation missiles launched from aircraft at a range of 130 km from the target. However, they had only a minor effect because 15 of the 30 missiles used did not reach their targets.
The “Paveway” laser-guided bomb, used for the first time, was launched 60 km from the target. In addition, “Bullpup” missiles with laser targeting devices were used; 30 to 40% of these did not detonate.
As a result of the employment of the above munitions, a total of five Libyan national air defense anti-aircraft missile units were lost, specifically:
- 2 “Volchov” anti-aircraft missile units
- 1 “NEVA” anti-aircraft missile unit
- 1 “KUB” anti-aircraft missile unit, and
- 1 French “CROTALE II” anti-aircraft missile system unit.
Air Force Marshall Koldunov cited as reasons for the limited effectiveness of the Libyan air defenses, in that only 10 of the 70 aircraft that were used were destroyed:
1. Poor command and control of LIBYA’s air defense forces and weapons, lack of a clear mission, and poor interaction.
2. Poor political perspective/morale among the crews and personnel manning the radar stations, missile control stations, and anti-aircraft missile complexes. Cowardice among some of the crews, who fled their positions in panic during the air attacks.
3. Insufficient level of training among air defense forces and consequently poor mastery of modern Soviet technology.
4. Inadequate organization of radar reconnaissance over the MEDITERRANEAN. Minimum acquisition altitude of radar field was only 250 to 300 m. This meant that the extremely low-flying American aircraft were not acquired as targets.
(Due to its own arrogance, the Libyan military did not act on requests and recommendations put forth by Soviet specialists to organize the radar field so that it would be possible to acquire targets at altitudes of 50 m and greater).
Secret – Classified Material!
[stamp:] BStU
GVS-No. : A 456 721 Copy 5 page 2 20
5.
LIBYA’s fighters were not used to engage and destroy the intruding aircraft.
In conclusion, Air Force Marshall Koldunov stressed that there would be a thorough evaluation of the military aspects of the US aggression against LIBYA pending the return of the group of Soviet specialists that had been sent to LIBYA on 20 April 1986.
The information collected and lessons learned from this evaluation will be provided to the Ministers of Defense for the Warsaw Pact nations.
The first that catches the eye in this report is to see how poor Marshall Koldunov's informations about US operations and deployed weapons were. In fact, one could find more about the US strikes against Libya in contemporary Western press, and in that way, one could certainly get some much better informations about the weapons systems deployed by the USN and the USAF. Just for example, Marshall Koldunov reported about AGM-88s with a range of „130kms“, „Paveway LGBs with a range of 60km“ and Bullpup "laser targeting devices"....
No wonder, Koldunov - then the CO of the Soviet PVO - was thrown out from the service because of the Mathias Rust affair only one year later...
But, on the other side, his report is highly interesting because of quite a few details about the Libyan equipment and capabilities it reveals - as well as obvious differences between the Libyans and their Soviet instructors. The last detail shows once again how much "Soviet influenced" such Arab regimes like the Libyan - or Iraqi - actually were.
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| LARAF/ADF SA-6 SAMs seen on a parade in Tripolis, in 1987. One year earlier, at least one battery of SA-6s was destroyed by USN fighters, while the SA-6s could not prevent US strikes against different targets. (US DoD) |
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