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Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database
Hard Target: Rolling-Back Iranian Nuclear Programmes
By Dr. Michael Knights
Dec 18, 2003, 12:08
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Iran’s nuclear programme will remain a hot topic in Washington throughout the summer of 2005 as well, as shuttle diplomacy and International Atomic Energy Agency meetings seek to find a diplomatic solution to an issue which has grown in significance since Iran unveiled its emerging capability to produce nuclear fuels, in February 2003. We have learned that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has changed its internal estimate of the date of Iranian nuclear weapon ‘breakout’ an unprecedented four times within only twelve months, in 2002 and 2003, signifying its growing alarm at the development of the programme.
Current estimates suggest that Iran will develop sufficient nuclear fuel for 2-3 small bombs during 2006 unless the multiple paths of Iranian proliferation are permanently or temporarily interdicted. Iran is unlikely to voluntarily step down from the nuclear threshold, which will satisfy the Islamic Republic’s long-term focus on self-reliance and deterrence, and fulfil the country’s pre- and post-revolution belief that Iran deserves nuclear status due to its historical regional role. The Bush administration’s counter-proliferation strategy is to delay the Iranian nuclear programme whilst at the same time seeking to speed up regime change, based on a belief that Iran is ripe for democratic counter-revolution and that a democratic Iran would relinquish nuclear weapons as post-apartheid South Africa did.
Washington has a number of diplomatic irons in the fire, but none of them are certain to reverse what is clearly a determined, long-term strategic decision, supported by a broad range of Iranian leaders. As insurance, planners in US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and US Central Command (CENTCOM) have begun to dust off Iranian contingency plans from the late 1980s and evaluate military options for rolling back Iranian nuclear programmes. Israel is even less willing to accommodate itself to a nuclear Iran, has made strenuous efforts in Washington to push the US into action, and remains willing to act unilaterally if collective action fails. Counter-proliferation strikes on nuclear sites are uncommon but by no means unprecedented. Since attacks on Germany’s embryonic nuclear program in the Second World War, Iraq’s nuclear plant at Osiraq was bombed by Iran in 1980 and Israel in 1981, whilst Iran’s Bushehr reactor site was subjected to air attacks by Iraq throughout the 1984-88 period. In the 1991 Gulf War, the US set a precedent by attacking the Tuwaitha nuclear site while radioactive materials were present, and two years later, in January 1993, the US fired 44 Tomahawk missiles at a suspected Iraqi uranium enrichment facility at Zafaraniyah. Yet, these precedents represent far smaller endeavours than a strike on Iran’s large-scale and widely dispersed nuclear programme, which would be the largest counter-proliferation operation attempted to date. But how feasible would such a strike be, and how could its scope be controlled to prevent the outbreak of general hostilities with Iran?
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| Tactical pilotage chart of the Bushehr area, showing the Khark Island in north-east, the Bushehr airfield (IRIAF's TFB.6), and the position of the building site of the first two Iranian nuclear reactors. Although much is being said about a possible Israeli strike against this reactor, closer analysis reveals that such an operation would make very little sence, then the most important Iranian nuclear facitilies - especially those that could be brought in connection with potential nuclear weapons program - are positioned deep inside Iran, mainly between Tehran and Esfahan. (Tom Cooper collection) |
Target-Set Development
The first stage in planning the air operation is to develop military objectives that serve the overall political objective of delaying Iranian nuclear breakout. In broad terms, the operation could either seek to do the minimum necessary to cause delay – involving highly selective ‘bottleneck’ or nodal targeting – or the maximum, involving a far broader set of targets including surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and necessitating widespread attacks on the integrated air defence system (IADS). For Israel, a highly limited strike is a necessity; for the US it would represent a choice. A planner from the US Office of the Secretary of Defense told AFM that the US planning community remains undecided on the issue, and US STRATCOM planners are likely to develop a tiered set of employment plans. As Iran may well regard even a limited strike as the start of general hostilities, it might be logical to strike as many targets as possible while paying the same price in terms of political fallout. Alternately, a limited strike could considerably reduce military and political exposure from the operation by restricting the number and types of targets, thereby reducing risk to friendly forces and Iranian military and civilian personnel, and obviating most of the need for host-nation basing in the region. Target set development and nodal analysis represents key means of scaling the minimal and maximal options.
Selecting which target sets to strike gives the air campaign its character. A potential list of target systems and components are generated and prioritised. The core target set for both minimal and maximal operations would be the Iranian nuclear industry. Attacks on Iran’s air defences would not seek to cause long-term degradation, though any maximal plan would require a broader range of air defence targets to be struck. Beyond this, the two concepts of operations diverge. A maximal operation might embrace a wider strike against known or suspected non-nuclear elements of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, such as alleged biological weapons centres recently designated by the Iranian opposition – the Mojaheddin-e Khalq Organisation (MKO). As in Desert Fox, the US may strike delivery systems – strategic missiles and long-range aircraft – as a means of setting back Iran’s overarching capability to deploy WMD. Unlike Israel, the US would have a responsibility to screen its own deployed forces in the Gulf and the maritime assets and homelands of regional allies from any Iranian response. This could draw the US into strikes on anti-shipping missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and naval forces. The US could also launch counter-terrorism strikes against the sections of Iran’s government accused of sponsoring terrorism – the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Quds sections of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) – or in response to actionable intelligence that located Al Qaeda or Hezbollah leadership figures in Iran. A maximal air operation in Iran would thus have great potential for ‘mission creep’, with an ever-broadening number of systems filling out the target list.
Nodal analysis provides one method of increasing the scope of an air campaign without increasing its size. The focus is on system criticality and vulnerability to attack. Striking only the most pivotal target systems requires precise intelligence, however, and the track record of counter-proliferation strikes is not encouraging in this respect. After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, it transpired that the US identified only two of twenty major Iraqi nuclear installations. In the run-up to the Gulf War, Iraq was pursuing its nuclear proliferation programme in relatively plain sight, accelerating its attempts to produce weapons grade material and raising the visible signature of nuclear facilities. By Desert Fox, Iraq had become so adept at concealing its dispersed residual WMD infrastructure that the only visible element was the declared portions of Iraq’s missile design programme. Iran has had over a decade to observe Iraqi concealment practices and is likely to thoroughly disperse its WMD programmes amongst small workshops, nesting them within dual-use industrial facilities and pharmaceutical or chemical industries, or burying them at remote, low-profile government facilities.
Any nodal analysis of the nuclear target set must include a brief explanation of the nuclear fuel cycle and the two main paths – enriching or reprocessing - that can be taken to produce weapons grade material. Both paths begin by securing a supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Iran has long been promised a rolling annual supply of LEU from Russia that are due to begin later this year or early next year. Under US pressure, Russia is now attempting to push back delivery of LEU at least until the current crisis passes. In a hedge against this move, Iran has been developing the means to indigenously produce LEU to supplement or replace Russian fuel. The process involves three stages; (1) mining and milling natural uranium ore from central Iran; (2) conversion of the ore to UF6 gas; and (3) uranium enrichment using gas centrifuge technology. The LEU created by this process (or acquired from Russia or some other source) now needs to be subjected to further, covert procedures outlawed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The first path uses ongoing uranium enrichment, which involves putting acquired or indigenous LEU put through additional cycles of enrichment in gas centrifuges until highly enriched uranium (HEU) suitable for use in weapons is manufactured. This path is slower – giving Iran enough HEU for 2-3 small bombs by 2006 - but easier to conceal. The second path uses reprocessing, which takes place after LEU is formed into fuel rods at a fuel fabrication facility and used for a limited period of time in a nuclear reactor. The fuel rods are removed and locally reprocessed, yielding a far greater proportion of HEU, particularly during the new reactor’s early period of operation. This route produces a far more observable signature but could produce enough HEU for between 20-60 small bombs by 2006-08 if Russia helps Iran complete its first large nuclear reactor at Bushehr in 2003-04. The HEU produced by either route would finally need to be fabricated into weapon cores at an advanced metallurgical or fuel fabrication facility. These paths and processes form a chain which the US or Israel seeks to break at one or more points.
Nodal analysis of Iran’s nuclear programme is a complex process and there are multiple means of delaying nuclear breakout. The selection of targets would likely be influenced in part by choices and partly by the limits of available intelligence; it is a truism that air forces can only strike what they can find and many critical nodes of the Iranian nuclear programme may not be detectable. US and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials canvassed by AFM indicated that Iran is likely to pursue parallel overt and covert nuclear programmes, suggesting a growing set of critical nodes that will remain concealed. Potential target systems involved in LEU production and uranium enrichment include:
Mining and milling facilities: These are located in central Iran and are largely resistant to air attacks. The mixture of open pit and closed shaft mines can not be decisively interdicted and natural uranium milling facilities are cheap to construct and have no distinctive signature that could identify them.
UF6 conversion plants: The primary UF6 facility is the Rudan Nuclear Research Centre, near Shiraz. Such sites also have no distinctive signature and there are likely to be other smaller facilities, possibly nested within universities. One known alternative UF6 location is the Physics Research Centre, Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, and another facility may be sited at the University of Isfahan. UF6 facilities represent one of the critical nodes that Iran would find hardest to repair or replace.
Gas centrifuge enrichment plants: The largest known enrichment facility, partially inspected by the IAEA in February, is located in central Iran at Natanz. The key feature will be its large ‘centrifuge cascades’, which may see up to 5,000 centrifuges installed in rows within large underground halls. A single plant like Natanz could service the whole nuclear weapons programme, but Iran is unlikely to place all its eggs in one basket. The facility’s legitimate role is to enrich fuel for eventual use in Iran’s Bushehr reactor, but Natanz can only produce roughly 40% of the LEU required each year to keep Bushehr running, suggesting that Iran is planning further overt plants. By diverting the proceeds of as few as 2,000 centrifuges nationwide, Iran will be able to produce HEU for 2-3 small bombs a year. Iran is also likely to build smaller, covert gas centrifuge cascades. Whilst Natanz was discovered, other centrifuge cascades may be harder to find. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security told AFM that whilst Natanz had been identified as some form of restricted government facility and under US surveillance for some time, the site was only identified as a uranium enrichment facility by ‘a process of elimination; the site had no distinct signature’. Though major centrifuge cascades require large amounts of electricity, subterranean cabling can connect sites to remote electricity generators, increasing reliance on US ground-penetrating radar sensors. Alternatively, such facilities can be highly decentralised, with thousands of centrifuges dispersed amongst small, nondescript buildings; the MKO recently suggested that two such plants were located at Lashkar Abad and Ramadah, some 40km west of Tehran. Early statements by IAEA chairman Mohammed El Baradei indicate that a pilot centrifuge facility may have preceded Natanz. Possible alternative sites for major centrifuge cascades include the Karaj Centre for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Technology, the Rudan Nuclear Research Centre at Fasa, and the Muallum Kalayeh compound near Qazvin. The key limitation on striking enrichment facilities is thus that they are dispersed and can be quickly replaced.
Centrifuge production facilities: Attacking the industrial base of centrifuge production may also provide inconclusive. Well known specialised metallurgical design and manufacturing facilities such as the National Iranian Steel Company and the Applied Research Centre are not required for centrifuge design, which involves relatively simple engineering techniques that have not changed since the 1940s. Iranian statements have consistently stressed the high decentralised structure of the manufacturing effort.
The reprocessing path involves a further set of potential target nodes:
Fuel fabrication facilities: Though Iran has intimated that it operates a fuel fabrication facility, the location is not known and such facilities have has no signature recognisable to remote sensing (satellites, aircraft). Bomb assembly facilities, which may be collocated with fuel fabrication facilities, also have no discernable signature.
Nuclear reactors: Iran plans to complete the long awaited 1,000 megawatt light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr within the next two years. A further two large and two small LWR may thereafter be installed by Russian and Chinese firms. A number of very small research reactors are scattered in universities across Iran. There are signs that Iran may develop a heavy water reactor (HWR), which produces spent fuel that yields higher proportions of weapons grade material when reprocessed. A newly discovered facility in central Iran – the Arak heavy water production plant – will make precursors vital to the operation of HWR. This facility and other like it have a distinctive physical signature that makes them hard to conceal. A covertly assembled Iranian HWR would be difficult to detect during construction but relatively easy to locate when operating.
Reprocessing facilities: No Iranian reprocessing facilities have thus far been identified. According to David Albright, Iran will favour smaller, ‘disposable’ reprocessing plants to large, visible sites with distinctive isotopic and heat signatures. Iran only needs around 10-20kg of weapons grade material to build 2-4 small weapons, and one small site would be able to produce 10kg of usable material from light water reactor spent fuel in around 12 months. Designs for such crude reprocessing plants are available, export controls on their components are relatively lax, and though the facilities would occasionally have accidents (such as releases of heat and radiation into the water table), such releases would not be detected immediately.
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| Iran is known to have received at least two batteries of SA-10 (S-300PMU) SAMs from Russia. These became ooperational in February 2003, but are so far known to have been deployed only in the Tehran area. Reported deliveries of SA-15 (9K331 Tor) SAMs was never confirmed. (Photo: GlobalSecurity.org) |
Current US government thinking remains focused on the high-profile and long-running issue of the Bushehr reactors, which are highly likely to be targeted in any strike due to their pivotal role in the reprocessing pathway. Counter-proliferation experts are more concerned with the lower-profile enrichment route, which could begin operation sooner and prove harder to interdict. Critical nodes on the enrichment pathway are the UF6 plant near Shiraz and the Natanz enrichment facility, plus any other similar facilities that may be revealed. These three nodes are likely to be the key targets in a minimal strike option; the full range of identified nuclear nodes would be considered in any maximal strike. In such an attack, the US could also focus on Iran’s strategic delivery systems as a means of degrading overall WMD capabilities. A counterforce strike against Iran’s strategic missile forces would require an extensive effort. The US would not be able to directly strike at Iran’s numerous weapons systems, which are deployed to nine operational units and are highly mobile through their utilization of imported and indigenous transporter-erector launchers (TEL). Instead, the US would likely strike at assembly facilities, specialized metal production, fuel-related chemical plants, and test and telemetry facilities. Though these fixed sites are relatively simple to strike, their number makes it unlikely that the US will undertake such an option.
Iran’s air defences have the potential to complicate US and Israeli planning and distract effort from other target sets, despite suffering from key weaknesses. The Achilles heel of the Iranian system remains its ability to generate early warning and act as an integrated system. To protect high altitude attackers the relatively small number of surveillance radars would be easy to blind through Tomahawk cruise missile strikes, while low-level approaches would be aided by the ‘creases’ in the air defence net caused by Iran’s mountainous terrain. Command and control within and between the different military arms responsible for air defence is likely to be sluggish, due to a lack of automation and bureaucratic harmony, as well as inter-service bickering. Except for two newly arrived batteries of Almaz S-300PMU (NATO designation SA-10), Iran’s surface-to-air missiles (SAM) are well-known to the US and Israel, carrying electronics that are generations behind the countermeasures carried by US and Israeli aircraft. Yet, during the long war with Iraq the Iranians proved to know the importance of ECM, as well as easily adaptable to new threats, while the long decade in which the US watched Iraq’s air defences the Iranians have watched US SEAD capabilities developing from the "front row". Iran’s air defences are an unpredictable adversary. Its SAM forces are highly mobile and provide cover at all altitude bands, presenting the US with problems in identifying and skirting numerous missile engagement zones, or destroying launchers with preprogrammed Tomahawk shoots. Most importantly, Iran maintains large and capable interceptor forces, including F-14A Tomcats carrying powerful and considerably upgraded AWG-9 radars and domestically-upgraded AIM-54 Phoenix missiles capable of beyond-visual-range kills against large bomber or high-value command and control or tanker aircraft. These combined capabilities make it very difficult for the US to map the Iranian air defence system. As a result of Iran’s dual land-based and airborne air defence capabilities, the range of targets required to carry out SEAD are doubled. As well as defensive and offensive counterair CAP, strikes may need to be launched against Iranian sortie generation through the cratering of take-off surfaces.
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| The fact that the IRIAF still operates a sizeable fleet of fully operational - and considerably upgraded - Grumman F-14A Tomcat interceptors is still either largely ignored, or completely unknown even to "well-informed" Western observers. The Iranian F-14-fleet, however, could cause immense problems to any potential aggressor. (Photo: Farzad Bishop) |
Weaponeering
Weaponeering needs to take into account a range of factors, including the vulnerabilities of target systems, constraints on collateral damage, plus weather conditions and the air defence threat environment. The location of Iran’s nuclear targets complicates this process. Many of the supporting sites are located in civilian industrial or academic complexes, necessitating extreme precision and reliability. Many potential targets, including any eventual reactors at Bushehr, will be physically hardened and some will be physically large, requiring large munitions. Aside from reactors, many facilities will have an underground component. The Natanz site provides an example. IAEA inspectors reported construction of two-metre thick walls and suggested that the three 190x170m cascade halls will be underground. The 75 foot deep foundations of these halls are typical of ‘cut and cover’ facilities aimed at reducing vulnerability to aerial attack. The generator halls are likely to be covered with a thick reinforced concrete blast cap and either rock rubble or packed earth overburden. Judging by its length and orientation, the vehicle entrance ramp looks to be designed to dissipate and deflect blast effects, and defeat direct glide bomb or bouncing bomb strikes. Iran is also suspected of developing deeply buried facilities through tunnelling into limestone and granite mountainsides. Weather and threat considerations suggest that weapons will be required to strike fixed targets through cloud from high altitudes (allowing extensive stand-off even from guided bombs), suggesting a natural role for satellite-guided munitions.
For the minimal option – striking Bushehr, plus known UF6 and enrichment facilities – the weaponeering requirement would thus be primarily for large munitions capable of broaching hardened vertical and ‘cut and cover’ buried targets. For Israel, this would necessitate direct attacks using 2,000lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Stand-off options such as air-launched Popeye and Popeye II missiles, or sub-launched Harpoon or Popeye Turbo missiles might not guarantee sufficient hard-target capability if employed with anything short of pinpoint accuracy. The US would be able to choose from a broader range of weapons. For deeply buried or hardened ‘cut and cover’ targets, the US would need to rely on systems developed under the rubric of the Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System. Though new systems are under development, the most capable deep penetrating munitions currently deployed with US forces – GBU-28/EGBU-37 satellite-guided bombs - can drill down through 20 feet of reinforced concrete or 100 feet of packed earth, utilising the Hard Target Smart Fuze to count layers or voids to allow precisely delayed detonation. The next generation of weapon – the Northrop Grumman/Lockheed Martin Deep Strike Hard Target Weapon (DSHTW) – will penetrate up to 30 feet of reinforced concrete and could be rushed into service as the GBU-28 was in 1991. Iranian sites buried to the depth that Natanz – with a cap of tens of feet of reinforced concrete – will present a major challenge to US engineers. The US could support bunker-busting attacks with a range of stand-off strikes against surface targets. Tomahawk cruise missiles and smaller stand-off weapons like AGM-142 Have Nap or the Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW) could peel air defences at varying ranges; Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM) such as the AGM-86D can utilise their three-metre accuracy and enhanced hard-target warheads to strike hardened and partially buried surface targets.
A final weaponeering decision would revolve around the danger of a radiological release or nuclear accident. If Bushehr could be hit before it became operational, the threat of a reactor accident would markedly decrease, and even afterwards it could be reduced by coinciding strikes with a partial shutdown during changeover of fuel supplies. If timing is not manipulated in this way, weaponeering would become critical. US or Israeli planners would have to carefully weight the risks and opportunities of attempting to vaporise nuclear fuel present at the site. Extremely high heat – such as might be generated by new US thermobaric ‘agent defeat’ munitions – could create a fast-rising plume of vaporised radioactive material that could be carried some distance if high winds were present. The use of smaller explosive warheads could shatter a nuclear core with a direct hit causing no vaporisation. Alternately, the core could be shattered or even vaporised, whilst precise attacks on the key load-bearing members of a reactor building or other nuclear facility would simultaneously entomb nuclear facilities.
Force application
The minimum force packages required by an Israeli or US strike would vary widely. An Israeli strike on a single Iranian nuclear facility would require the mobilisation of a substantial portion of the Israeli Air Force’s long-range strike capability and the utilisation of innovative basing or airborne refuelling solutions. Bushehr is the only facility that offers the right blend of feasibility and payoff for the Israeli Defence Forces. An Israeli strike would probably not directly engage the IADS and would focus on threat avoidance. The force package could theoretically be as small or smaller than the 14-ship Osiraq strike force as a result of improvements in IAF precision strike and self-protection capabilities. A strike on Bushehr would be much more difficult that the 1981 Osiraq strike. Ingress could be achieved via a wide array of routes, which fall into two categories – overland and littoral. The overland options follow the same pattern as the Osiraq strike, with Israeli aircraft penetrating the airspace of the states between Israel and Iran. Spoofing or old-school low-level penetration would be necessary because none of Iran’s neighbours, even Turkey, could be openly approached to support such an attack. Overland options offer the most direct routes – roughly 1,500km through Iraq, 1,900km through Saudi Arabia, and 2,600km through Turkey – and could be undertaken by F-15I with limited post-launch refuelling support or even by F-16I using new buddy-refuelling capabilities. The disadvantage lies in the air defence environment, which has tightened considerably since 1981. US-controlled Iraq presents the best option, but poses a dilemma. With the effective cessation of no-fly zone activities and the low level of air threat, the US Central Command air defence posture is relaxed and Israeli aircraft would be unlikely to face interception by the light combat air patrol (CAP) screen over Iraq, or indeed by the more substantial CAP around US aircraft carriers in the Gulf. Despite this misidentifications and other accidents can occur as a result of unauthorised air activity and the US position in Iraq could be compromised by the action, exacerbating diplomatic tensions. Turkish air defences would resist any unauthorised penetration, whilst diversion from a bilateral exercise or other deceptive actions would cause a major rift in the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance. Saudi air defences could not be counted upon to be as quiescent or inefficient as those in 1981. Though Israel could probably exploit nap-of-the-earth ‘creases’ in the radar coverage provided by the Saudi ground-based radar system and overstretched AWACS orbits, such a strike would have to pass three air defence sector operations centres. The littoral route would be a longer but ultimately safer method of ingress. If launched from Israel, the inbound leg would be approximately 5,400km. Basing or recovery from a Red Sea base in Eritrea – where Israeli listening posts and submarine refuelling facilities are hosted – would reduce the outbound or recovery journeys by up to 1,400km each way. Though Israel’s Transport Fleet Squadron of Boeing 707-320s, upgraded by Israel Aircraft Industries, recently supported F-15I on a 3,800km return flight from the UK, a strike on Iran would open a new chapter in Israel’s long-range strike capabilities. A littoral strike on Bushehr would double the previous longest strike – the 2,060km strike on the Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Tunis in 1985 - and would require pilots to undertake an unprecedented ten to fourteen hour mission. For Israeli aircraft undertaking direct attacks without local jamming support, egress from Bushehr would be extremely challenging to say the least.
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| The IDF/AF could deploy its sizeable fleet of F-15Is - but also modified F-15Ds, ared with Popeye (AGM-145 Have Nap) stand-off weapons - for striking targets in Iran. The aircraft could reach targets in south-eastern Iran on own fuel if taking a direct route - but only at an unknown political cost for Israel. (Photo: ACIG.org archive) |
Despite the overwhelming operational advantages, concern about the political controversy of basing strikes from neighbouring Iraq is likely to deter the US from using Iraqi bases as a launch pad for strike aircraft. Even if the US were to launch a minimal strike against Bushehr, the UF6 plant at Shiraz, the Natanz facility, and a select group of associated targets in central Iran, a major threat assessment would have to be undertaken. Ideally, the principal assets used would be long-range land attack cruise missiles, with a small but pivotal direct attack role for the B-2 Spirit. Yet, the use of ship and sub-launched Tomahawks or B-52-launched CALCM against the most distant targets would require the US to shoot from a Tomahawk ‘basket’ or a CALCM ‘box’ within the Gulf or just eastwards of the Straits of Hormuz, creating major force protection issues in the event of Iranian retaliation. Air-launched CALCM might not be a tenable option in this threat environment, placing greater emphasis on naval cruise missiles, further depleting their stocks after 802 Tomahawks were expended in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Even a limited strike would require relatively deep penetration of Iranian airspace by B-2 stealth bombers, which are the only means of delivering bunker-buster warheads in high-threat environments. The aircraft would probably have to be employed and recovered to the US Pacific base on Guam, as B-52s were during the unilateral US strike on Iraq in September 1996, codenamed Operation Desert Strike. Considering Britain’s position on Iran – which more closely follows the European Union policy of engagement than the US policy of containment – the US may find itself in the unusual position of lacking the full use of Diego Garcia as a bomber basing and recovery option. B-2 Spirits have deployed to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam before, and one specialised $2.5m B-2 hanger has been constructed there to complement the four at Diego Garcia and one at Fairford in the UK. Supporting a strike from Guam would be difficult but by no means unprecedented. During Desert Strike, a 34-hour mission was launched from Guam, involving two B-52s attended by two KC-10s, with top-up refuelling by 13 KC-135s stationed along the route and at Diego Garcia. If regional hosting for tankers could be secured from the UK (at Diego Garcia) or Oman, this form of solution would again be tenable. In terms of length, the missions would not exceed the small number of 44-hour missions flown in support of Operation Enduing Freedom in Afghanistan, and would benefit from new communications architectures to accept new route and mission planning whilst en route to theatre.
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| Recently acquired fleet of F-16Is could also be used for an Israeli strike against specific targets inside Iran. It is highly questionable, however, if even the IDF/AF could deliver a strike against all (known) relevant Iranian nuclear sites. (Photo: Lockheed Martin) |
If a broader range of nuclear or WMD delivery targets were struck, or if B-2 strikes were deemed to require full SEAD and electronic warfare packages, the force required would rapidly grow to incorporate the air assets of one or more US carrier battle group. Given Iran’s limited but developing submarine and long-range naval strike capabilities, the US carrier group(s) would have to remain at considerable distance from the Iranian shore and would need to undertake the full range of aerial, surface, and sub-surface protective measures. Offensive sorties would thus be limited, and naval EA-6B jammers and F/A-18 HARM-shooters and ‘Bombcat’ JSOW strikes might need to be supplemented by stand-off AGM-142 from long-range B-52 sorties. Tracking the mobile TEL and mobile SAM target sets would be extremely difficult unless regional bases were available to launch and recover the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that proved so effective in Iraq, including RC-135 Rivet Joint, Global Hawk, RQ-1 Predator, and E-8C JSTARS, though the low-profile support of these systems could be given from austere Iraqi airbases or Gulf allies for the short duration of the air strike.
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| USAF's B-2A Spirit "stealth" bombers would play a dominant role in any scenario envisaging an attack against Iran. Considering potential capabilities of Iranian air defences, they might be the only aircraft capable of penetrating specific parts of the Iranian airspace. (Photo: USAF) |
Conclusion
Though remaining a low probability for the time being, a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear programmes cannot be discounted and highlights a number of critical issues about the emerging strengths and weaknesses of air power. Any strike would be undertaken at the very limits of the US and Israeli envelopes due to restrictions on regional hosting and overflight rights. Targeting intelligence would be the key limiting factor on the prosecution of the operation for the US, which would struggle to keep the campaign manageably small and focused on Iran’s nuclear targets. A minimal strike would result in equally minimal delay to Iran’s nuclear breakout, which is now dispersed, multiply-redundant, and all but inevitable. Yet, the operational challenges of mounting a decisive strike on Iran’s nuclear programme are dwarfed by the political fallout that would certainly occur if such a strike were launched. The ‘bitter lesson of Osiraq’, David Albright explained to AFM, was that the strike merely drove Iraq to disperse, conceal, and expand its nuclear programme, and a strike on Iran would likely have the same effect. Such a strike could not be carried out alongside a policy of speeding up political reform, as any US attack would greatly strengthen the conservative theocratic faction in Iranian politics, dissipating the pro-democracy and pro-American tendencies that have slowly grown through the past decade.
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| Considerably upgraded Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS of the USAF would also be of immense importance for a success of any kind of aerial campaign against Iran. The USAF, however, might find its AWACS fleet faced with several problems: Iran is a mountaineous country, and AWACS are not able to "see" very deep into the Iranian airspace. They are also very likely to become major targets for Iranian interceptors, equipped with missiles that outrange the AIM-120 by a considerable margin! (Photo: USAF) |
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| One of most important unknowns in all assessments about possible military action against Iran is that of possible Iranian reaction. Iran is known to be in possession of assets enabling it to hit back, yet the availablity of these assets and the will of the regime in Tehran to deploy them in retaliation are unclear to most observers. Meanwhile, in the recent years the Iranian defence sector is introducing one modification after the other: the photograph above shows an ex-Iraqi Su-24MK, modified in Iran to receive fuel from (US-made) Beech 1600 refuelling pods, carried under the wing-tip of a Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker. (Photo: Farzad Bishop) |
Notes about Author
Dr. Michael Knights worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, and has meanwhile undertaken extensive research on lessons learned from the U.S. military operations in Iraq during and since 1990. He earned his doctorate at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and has worked as a defense journalist for the Gulf States Newsletter and Jane's Intelligence Review.
Original version of this article was published in AirForces Monthly magazine, volume September 2003.
© Copyright 2002-3 by ACIG.org
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I Persian Gulf War, 1980-1988
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Kuwait "Emergency", 1961
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Oman (and Dhofar) 1952-1979
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South Arabia and Yemen, 1945-1995
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