Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 2

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Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 2
By Dr. Michael Knights
Dec 18, 2003, 12:09

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Three case studies of GCC procurement policy

Bahrain
Partly as a result of the strong US military aid it receives, Bahrain is likely to distribute most of its arms purchases amongst US vendors and surplus US government equipment. Bahrain’s relationship with the US has been very close since 1971, when US security guarantees and basing agreements quickly replaced similar arrangements with the British. Since then, Bahrain has proved to be a steadfast naval base and a useful host of US aerospace expeditionary forces, acting as a replacement aircraft carrier when US naval vessels could not be spared. As well as providing low or no-cost equipment, Bahrain enjoys a high degree of trust in the US Congress, and has accessed sensitive technologies such as the Raytheon FIM-92 Stinger and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, where other Arab allies of the US might have failed.

Though lacking the financial clout to dictate requirements for cutting-edge US technology – as the UAE and, increasingly, Kuwait has done – Bahrain has displayed canny procurement practices throughout the past decade. This has not been in the field of offset development, where Bahrain remains poor, but in the fields of cost-saving and technology transfer. Key upgrades, such as the F-5E/F modernisation, have been procured at little cost, involving US EDA transfers. Where major purchases have been necessary, Bahrain has taken the long-term view and opted for the most advanced technologies on offer.

A case in point is the Peace Crown I and II purchases of Block 40 F-16C/Ds. Though the US offered former US Air Force and embargoed Pakistani F-16A/B Block 10/15 aircraft (with mid-life upgrades), as well as downgraded US F-16N models, Bahrain applied total life cycle costing perspectives to the deal and stuck to its demand for more sophisticated models. Rejecting the inferior J-79 engines offered with some US models, the Bahrain Amiri Air Force meticulously weighed the technical merits of General Electric and Pratt and Whitney engines, extracting the best terms available from each vendor. Bahrain also insisted that the advanced Raytheon AMRAAM missile be incorporated into the Peace Crown II deal, becoming the first nation in the Gulf to receive the missile and starting the technology break-out that has seen three other GCC countries receive the type in short order. Peace Crown II included the purchase of ten new-build F-16 Block 50/52 and the upgrade of Bahrain’s 12 Block 40 models to Block 50/52 standard.

Kuwait
Though Sheikh Jaber al Mubarak al Hamad al Sabah, Kuwait’s Deputy Minister of Defence, stated in 2002 that arms purchases were always constructed according to the merits of the weapons rather than the demands of ‘supplier politics’, Kuwait habitually diversified the source of arms to retain influence across the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Since 1992, Kuwait has ordered $7.25 billion worth of defence equipment from the US, $897 million from the U.K., $572 million from France, with vastly reduced totals from Russia and China.

The US has also supplied vast amounts of low or no cost Excess Defence Articles (EDA) - surplus US equipment. Though Kuwait is likely to continue to receive a high proportion of new and used US equipment, the Paladin howitzer deal showed that legislators could move to block deals if they involve non-competitively priced downgraded or surplus US equipment. Kuwait has historically accepted such deals – including the $1.9 billion deal that saw substantially downgraded Boeing F/A-18C/D delivered to Kuwait with tight restrictions on their employment.

Kuwait now displays more savvy procurement polices, however, and has begun to use its leverage as a high spender in a buyer’s market. The AH-64D deal - twelve years in the making – is a testament to Kuwait’s determination to acquire top-quality versions of equipment. Kuwait held out, risking a major capability shortfall in the meantime, to ensure it received a highly advanced version of the Apache. This is a major turnaround when it is recalled that Kuwait was initially only allowed to purchase downgraded F/A-18C/D and ordnance on the proviso that it relinquished other older US aircraft it had on a one to one basis for the new aircraft. Kuwait, like many Gulf States, is no longer willing to jump through US Congressional hoops in this manner, and has instead purchased a deadly and highly survivable day/night tank-killer.

The high unit cost of the deal may well raise eyebrows in the National Assembly’s attentive Public Accounts Committee (or Audit Bureau), and parliamentarians are bound to comb the clauses of a deal with so much room for kickbacks and commissions. The deal was carried out as a government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) rather than commercial transaction, indicating that oversight will be present at the US end at least. If Kuwaiti intermediaries profit at all, it will be through the choice of industries for offset investment, which could total ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ according to government spokesmen. The Ministry of Finance and Countertrade’s Offset Department looks set to monitor the agreement closely.

After more than ten years of almost continuous confrontations with Iraq, but also extensive US support, the Kuwait Air Force is now very compatible with the US military. Seen are KAF F/A-18C fighters, armed with AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles (Photo: USMC)

UAE
The UAE – for reasons of interoperability and effective relationship as much as any other – predominantly buys French and US armaments, and can effectively play off these vendors against each other. Deals are judged strictly on their technical and offset merits, however, setting new standards of professionalism in GCC procurement practices. The Khalifa Directive of December 1986 stated that no commissions agents or mediators were to be utilised in the sale of lethal equipment, though this ban has slowly extended to most military equipment. A professional tendering system operates through the UAE armed forces General Headquarters. The UAE Offsets Group strictly requires that offsets worth at least 60 percent of the value of deals be fulfilled within seven years (ten at the maximum), with milestones at three and five years, and with strong focus on profitability not simply investment.

The UAE was reported to be mulling a major investment into the Russian air defence industry in 2002-03 as part of a mooted $4 billion purchase of Antei-Antey surface-to-air missiles and air defence sensors. Though the scale of this deal is in doubt, the UAE has, in the past, allowed Russian debts to the federation to be liquidated in return for 50 Pantsir S-1 air defence units, redesigned to UAE specifications that boosted interoperability with western equipment and therefore export prospects. The Pantsir deal was an early example of UAE direct investment in foreign defence industries, a growing trend that reveals features of the UAE’s increasingly assertive and sophisticated procurement policy.

Though outspent in raw value terms by both Saudi Arabia ($24.2 billion in FY2001) and Iran ($4.6 billion), the UAE procurement drive has been both well timed and well executed. The UAE effectively started from scratch and does not have to service large fleets of aircraft, ships, or land formations, as both Saudi Arabia and Iran does. The 1995-2005 rearmament drive has been undertaken in a buyer’s market and the UAE has shown itself to be a tough negotiator, maintaining competition between French and US vendors and accessing top-grade technologies rather than the downgraded export versions that Saudi Arabia accepted during the 1980s and 1990s. Where equipment did not meet specifications, the UAE has displayed strong determination in its dealings with western vendors, particularly Dassault, with whom the federation enjoys a very close and frank relationship.

The UAE successfully forced Lockheed Martin and the US government to stump up a $2 billion performance bond to guarantee F-16 deliveries and extracted a no-questions-asked $160 million advance cash offset to seal the deal, on top of the standard 60 percent offset arrangement. To save the 2.5 percent fee levied by the US Department of Defence on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals, the UAE was allowed to make a direct commercial purchase of the aircraft. Finally, the UAE received the object codes required to update their aircraft mission computers with new types of threat without US assistance, allowing the UAE Air Force and Air Defences (UAEAFAD) to keep track of Israeli aircraft. This represents a new kind of relationship between the US and any Arab nation.

The UAE’s involvement in collaborative development projects makes it unique amongst GCC states. Though such involvement became highly advanced in the late 1990s, it has been ongoing in a number of low profile projects for twenty years. The UAE embarked into a secret, highly forward-looking relationship with GEC-Marconi-Dynamics (now Alenia Marconi Systems) in the 1980s to design and build the Al Hakim series of powered stand-off precision-guided munitions, over a decade before such weapons altered expectations in the 1991 Gulf War.

More recently, the UAE made a major and unprecedented investment in the US defence electronics industry, becoming the core partner in systems that will provide the backbone of the USA.F. of tomorrow. The F-16 deal included a $2.5 billion advance payment to assist in the development of a new internal avionics suite and $500 million towards the development of the Northrop Grumman APG-68 Agile Beam Radar. If USAF or export sales are made, the UAE will receive royalties. The U.A.E has also signalled its interest in becoming involved in the field of advanced next generation jet trainers and light combat aircraft.

As well as high levels of spending on procurement and research and design, the UAE has also focused an increasing proportion of its defence expenditure on training and expansion of personnel and maintenance. This more balanced approach to defence spending should remedy many current weaknesses in UAEAFAD capabilities, bringing UAE spending patterns into line with western air forces.

UAEAFAD Mirage 2000s are equipped with advanced sensors and weaponry, including al-Hakim series of stand-off PGMs. (Photo: Dassault Aerospace)

A holistic focus on manpower and maintenance
The more holistic focus on the human resources and technical support dimensions of air force design is also developing in the other GCC states. Contrary to their traditional focus on airframe purchases, the GCC states are increasingly remedying their weaknesses in the fields of manpower management, training, and indigenous maintenance capabilities. Significant efforts are being made to increase the number of indigenous groundcrew. Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE have best capitalised on US and French assistance to increase the number of local groundcrew. Saudi Arabia remains woefully undermanned in groundcrew.

GCC aircrews are slowly increasing in number, though only Bahrain has exceeded the comfortable minimum 1.5:1 pilot to aircraft ratio. Kuwait and the UAE continue to utilise US training opportunities to generate a steady flow of pilots. Fleet rationalisation and retirement is assisting pilot to aircraft ratios. GCC pilots are flying around 130 hours per year or more. The sophistication of training is increasing, with the integration of ‘train-as-you-fight’ features such as distributed mission-training systems that use linked simulators to allow units to train together at lower costs. The BAe Hawk trainer series is the regional standard, operating or on order in all GCC states. The GCC states collaborate effectively to facilitate training in the region, utilising Saudi airfields, ranges, and even training aircraft. Increasing numbers of western exercises provide additional training opportunities, and more frequent regional exercises are a sign that GCC states are individually determined to improve standards. Though training in the U.K. and US remains an indispensable part of air defence training, both Kuwait and the UAE have established air defence schools.

Maintenance and operations support are finally receiving the recognition they deserve in GCC air forces. The danger of maintaining insufficient spares has been recognised since the Saudi air force ground to a halt in 2001. Though expensive foreign contractor support packages and overseas overhaul facilities remain the preferred options for GCC states, there are signs that the Gulf’s largest aerospace spenders – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – are changing their practices, and in particular drawing more support services in-country to reduce costs and disruption to fleet readiness. Furthermore, these states have begun to build significant joint venture, locally based aerospace industry support facilities. The Ali Salam Aircraft Company and Advanced Electronics Company are two Saudi Arabia examples of successful offset-driven joint ventures, as is the UAE’s Gulf Aircraft Maintenance Company. Dassault is due to set up a depot-level maintenance facility in the UAE. In future, increasing numbers of modern new-build aircraft and weapons will decrease the maintenance burden, dovetailing with increased maintenance capabilities of GCC states to improve readiness.

Future Projects
More pragmatic threat and capability-driven procurement has led to rapid improvement in the quality of fleet management in GCC air and air defence forces, which are moving towards appropriate sizes for the tasks they undertake. In the majority of cases, this has involved expansions of fleets and the addition of new capabilities. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this has meant rationalisation, leading to downsizing through the mothballing aircraft types. Recent procurement indicate a bias towards multi-role models that display the ‘design elasticity’ to grow with their user’s requirements - the GCC preference for smaller, light fighter aircraft, benefiting from miniaturised avionics and other advanced features, is one example.

At the same time, there are still large numbers of ageing airframes in use in the Gulf, including over 120 transport helicopters over 20 years old (average age 27) and 59 transport aircraft over 20 years old (average age 27), indicating a strong market for replacements and upgrades. GCC air and air defence forces are only slowly homogenising and standardising their number of aircraft types. Polyglot fleets are still the norm, particularly in transport helicopter and aircraft inventories. Some GCC forces still field up to eight types of transport helicopter, with the average across the alliance being four. Across many fleets, increasing standardisation is slowly developing, however, largely driven by increasing U.S. sales, that are creating regional standards such as the F-16 and the C-130 families, and the E-2C Hawkeye.

The Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF)
The BAAF has notable gaps in its inventory – dedicated training aircraft, fixed wing transport aircraft, and maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft. In the case of transport aircraft the lack of capability has been a conscious choice, whilst, in the other cases, tight funding has constrained procurement.

Bahrain originally intended for the F-16 to be its sole combat jet, but could not secure U.S. sales of advanced versions of the type until the late 1980s and instead purchased the F-5E/F as a stopgap measure, not expecting to be operating the types simultaneously. Though the F-5E/F has allowed strong interoperability with Saudi Arabia, performs a useful training role and has been upgraded to perform effectively in the optimised anti-surface role, the BAAF will welcome the chance to standardise on the F-16 Block 50/52. Up to four more Block 50/52 may be purchased under the original approved limits of the Peace Crown agreements, and Bahrain may go as far as ordering another eight models to form a third squadron to replace the F-5E/F unit. The BAAF has, from the outset, been a believer in multi-role aircraft – through economic necessity as much as any operational reason – and the employment of optimised F-5E/F was not the preferred option of the organisation. Though Bahrain could still opt for ex-USAF inventory early block F-16s, it is likely to purchase inventory or new-build Block 50/52 aircraft. All 22 Bahraini F-16s now operate at this standard following the application of Falcon Up and Pratt and Whitney Engine Up structural and engine overhauls.

Bahrain may turn to BAe to build a package of training support, Pilatus PC-9 turboprop primary trainers, and Hawk 100 lead-in flight trainers (for the F-16). Bahrain has no turboprop trainers, a basic requirement for a modern air force, and would benefit from retiring hard-to-maintain F-5F twin-seaters and removing the advanced training burden from Bahrain’s four F-16D twin-seaters. Funding remains a problem, however, as the U.S. will not welcome the effective shuffling of its aid to fund European sales, while the provision of training aircraft is a notable area of U.S. weakness.

Nor is it clear whether Bahrain will establish a small fixed-wing transport fleet. As recently as 2000, Bahraini officers stated that the country had no requirement for a transport element. Compact geography and cost issues made case-by-case chartering (using Gulf-based Tiger Air) a more viable option. Despite this, Bahrain may be offered ex-U.S. C-130B at no or low cost, or more modern C-130H.

The BAAF may also pursue no or low cost U.S. options to meet army demands to modernise its helicopter fleet, where roughly twenty medium transport helicopters have been in service for 20-25 years. U.S. surplus Sikorsky Blackhawks are one option, whilst another would be IAR-330 Pumas reconditioned by Eurocopter Romania. Bahrain may purchase a Kaman SH-2G naval helicopter for its ex-U.S. Perry-class frigate, Sabha. As mentioned, one or more maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft may be purchased.

Purchased as a stop-gap measure until rights for acquisition of F-16s could be secured, the Northrop F-5Es still present one of two main assest of the Bahrain Amiri Air Force, the future of which remains unclear due to uncertainities regarding a number of training- and support projects. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Kuwait Air Force (KAF)
The KAF order of battle presents an orderly picture that many GCC states, reflecting on their heterogeneous inventories, would consider idyllic. For the most threatened frontline GCC state, however, there will always be more to do. Fighter, training, and transport fleets require upgrade and enlargement, while Kuwait’s ageing helicopters requires ongoing modernisation. Maintaining the current level of homogeneity will reduce absorption and maintenance costs.

Though modern by the KAF’s standards, the package of F/A-18C/D ordered by Kuwait in 1985 did not build in the longevity (or the quantity) required to keep Kuwaiti air forces competitive in the second decade of the 21st century. This will necessitate a near-term purchase to supplement the F/A-18C/D force and provide it with a package of modern weapons systems, including the Raytheon AMRAAM and advanced air-to-ground munitions. The most likely option remains a supplemental buy of Boeing F/A-18 aircraft, either modern C/D versions (up to $40 million per unit) or the advanced multi-role F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (between $50-80 million per unit). The deal is likely to involve as little as 10-20 airframes (most likely one squadron of 10-12), rather than the 35 originally conceived by U.S. vendors. Kuwait’s experience of ordering a major $2 billion package of U.S. aircraft and weapons should stand it in good stead, and the emirate is likely to insist that advanced features be incorporated into the package, including in-flight refuelling capability. Kuwait may link the sale to an upgrade package to bring the entire fleet up to the same standard.

French alternatives to a U.S. buy would need to overcome the negative cost issues associated with introducing a new type, as well as overcoming strong U.S. lobbying and market advantages. Either the $60-70 million Dassault Rafale or the $35-60 million Mirage 2000 family could be chosen, particularly if they offered substantially better technology transfer and offset programmes. Cost could also be reduced if Dassault managed to facilitate buy-back of Kuwait’s 13 Mirage F-1BK/CK aircraft, which have been upgraded and maintained by Dassault since they were retired from operational service. This kind of deal was used to sweeten the UAE purchase of Mirage 2000-9 in 1998, and Kuwait has previously successfully sold 23 A-4KU Skyhawks to the Brazillian Navy in 1998.

New fighter purchases will create a requirement for dedicated jet trainers to meet the need for pilots. Kuwait may support new fighter deals with new purchases of BAe Hawk 100 trainers.

Kuwait has, meanwhile, upgraded all its major fleets of European helicopters. French defence maintenance company COFRAS carried out full airframe and engine rebuilds on the SA-432K Gazelle fleet, and an EADS/Thales partnership will upgrade the SA-330/332 Puma and Super Puma fleets for $43 million.

Kuwait will also supplement its transport aircraft fleet with four Lockheed Martin C-130J aircraft ordered in December 1999 for $200 million. Kuwait could purchase up to four more aircraft. Up to three of Kuwait’s fleet may be converted or delivered as KC-130J tanker variants.

***imag4e:center***

Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO)
The RAFO needs to implement a long overdue fleet rationalisation programme, reducing the number of turboprop trainers, utility helicopters, and transport aircraft in operation. Through new purchases and upgrades, Oman is likely to emerge from the current five-year plan with a smaller but more modern and maintainable fleet with improved capabilities.

Through a mixture of well-timed upgrades of the capable Jaguar fleet and hard-nosed commitment to invest heavily in the F-16 Block 50/52, Oman will end the current decade with modern and capable fast jet forces. The $65 million Jaguar 97/GR.3 upgrade programme completed between 1997-2001 was smoothly executed in partnership with the U.K.’s RAF and Hunting Aviation. The product was a highly sophisticated day/night ground attack aircraft capable of carrying a wide range of precision-guided munitions. The 20 upgraded Jaguars will remain in service until around 2008 and could serve for even longer.

By that time, Oman will be operating 12 F-16C/D Block 50/52 multi-role aircraft and may order four more of the type to replace some of the capability lost when the Jaguar fleet retires, moving to a two type fleet (with the BAe Hawk). Oman took a long-term view when it ordered new build Block 50/52 models rather than refurbished ex-U.S. Air Force Block 10/15 models as some industry analysts predicted. Investing almost $400 million in one deal (plus a further $600 million in munitions and support services) was an unprecedented step for the RAFO, but is likely to represent a saving when viewed in terms of total life-cycle costing, as well as a lower maintenance burden. The F-16 was designed to grow with the requirements of the air forces using it, and the RAFO will benefit from increased interoperability with U.S. forces as well as F-16 users like Bahrain, Jordan, and the UAE

Following increasing mothballing of its ageing helicopter fleet, Oman is likely to invest heavily in homogenising its rotary forces in the current five-year plan. At least three types – the AB-205, AB-212, and AB-214 – will be retired, and 30 new airframes ordered. Contenders include the Eurocopter AS-532 Cougar, the Sikorsky S-70L Blackhawk, or the GKN Westland EH-101. Oman appears to have already committed up to $600 million in the April 2001 order for up to 20 Agusta Westland Super Lynx naval attack helicopters (likely to cost $32 million per unit). The state of the art Super Lynxes will strongly boost Omani anti-submarine and anti-surface vessel attack capabilities and two are likely to be mounted on the Royal Navy of Oman’s two 83m corvettes. Ten further helicopters may be purchased using funding of $250 million.

Oman also has an urgent need to upgrade or modernise its fixed-wing transport aircraft fleet, particularly considering the non-contiguous and expansive nature of Oman’s geography. At least three C-130J aircraft are likely to be ordered in the 2001-2005 period to reduce strain on the existing fleet of 3 C-130H and 8 Shorts Skyvan.

Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF)
The small QEAF inventory includes a number of ageing aircraft types and is in need of homogenisation.

The purchase of 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 combat aircraft (including nine EDA multi-role and three DDA trainer versions) provided the QEAF with a core multi-role air combat capability. The $1.2 billion deal propelled Qatar to become the world’s highest per capita defence spender of the late 1990s, Deliveries of aircraft and associated weaponry were completed between 1997-99, involving a complicated swap that took Qatar’s existing Mirage F-1 EDA fleet to Spain, via an upgrade programme at Dassault facilities in France. The aircraft swap netted Qatar $130 million, which was subtracted from the $1.2 billion deal.

Twelve fixed wing combat aircraft is insufficient, however, even for a state of Qatar’s size, and the emirate is likely to replace its six ageing Alpha Jets with another combat-capable trainer that could support ground forces in time of war. Qatar is unlikely to upgrade these jets, as experience has shown that the type can require up to $6 million worth of refurbishment per airframe (a factor that dissuaded the UAE from purchasing reconditioned Alpha Jets). If funding can be released, the frontrunner remains an order of 15-18 BAe Hawk 100, which were selected in 1996 as part of a broader $825 million deal, but the deal was frozen due to budget constraints.

In the near-term, Qatar is more likely to homogenise and supplement its fixed wing and helicopter transport fleets. Qatar has an urgent requirement for at least two fixed wing medium military transport aircraft. Qatar also requires up to 10 medium transport helicopters that can be armed for close air support missions, with the S-70L Blackhawk identified as a likely contender. In the meantime, upgraded Westland Commandos will continue to serve in the transport and naval attack role.

Acquisition of 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 multi-role fighters propolled the small Qatar Emiri Air Force into the front-line between Gulf air forces when it comes to combat capability: these aircraft are not only modern, or well-equipped, but also flown by pilots with considerable combat experiences from the war with Iraq, in 1991. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)
Saudi Arabia is an excellent illustration of the complex range of choices facing the Southern Gulf states as they are forced to rationalise their aircraft fleets. The following table categorises the key systems in the RSAF fleet in fleet management terms. It does not include the many small inventories of aircraft that exist within the RSAF and other services, often attached to the Royal Flight or the Saudi Armed Forces medical Service.

Saudi Arabia has prudently built its transport and trainer fleets around single types and has provided funding to keep up numbers of new aircraft of these types. The RSAF is likely to replace and augment its C-130 fleet with up to 70 new build C-130J aircraft in the near-term. Another ten KC-130H tankers may also be added.

Saudi Arabia may have taken steps to replace its ageing AB-212, AB-206, and Bell 205 helicopters in the near future. In Feb 2001, Saudi Arabia announced the purchase of 16 new transport aircraft from Finmechannica SpA subsidiary Agusta and Bell Helicopters for $150m. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia continues to operate 75 transport and utility helicopters that are between 22-35 years old, indicating the need for ongoing fleet replacements and upgrades.

In the field of combat aircraft, however, the Kingdom must rationalise its fleet management. The threat profile facing Saudi complicates the process. The RSAF faces the probability that Iranian, Yemeni, and eventually reconstituted post-Baathist Iraqi air-to-air capabilities are going to increase significantly in the mid-term, forcing consideration of the retention of optimised air superiority aircraft. The extreme ranges from which Saudi aircraft must fly to reach the heartlands of Iran or Iraq, or indeed trouble spots on the Saudi borders, means that long-range remains a key consideration in force planning. Reducing the maintenance burden of operational fleets is a further core concern.

Saudi Arabia has already given some indications as to its procurement strategy. The F-5E/F, though not completely mothballed as some reports suggest, have now fallen into a training role, leaving Saudi Arabia with a capability shortfall – close air support – that would not be easy to reconstitute in time of war. Minister of Defence and Aviation Prince Sultan noted in June 2001 that the F-5E/F were ‘still good and useful’ but would be replaced if Saudi had the opportunity.

Nine reconnaissance version RF-5E aircraft are likely to be kept in operation, having been upgraded and installed with Global Positioning System navigation in a $7.4 million Northrop Grumman deal in 1997. Twenty-seven mission planning systems for the RF-5E were purchased from U.S. firm Sanders Corporation in 1995, and Saudi has U.S. Congressional blessing for structural strengthening upgrades to extend the lifespan of the type.

The rest of the F-5 community appear to have been phased out of operation, with a small number of the 35 F-5B/F trainers continuing to fly and up to 53 F-5E ground attack aircraft in storage. These aircraft are believed to be in saleable condition having received regular $50 million Northrop Grumman maintenance inputs every two years until they reduced operations in 1997. Though the maintenance-heavy F-5 is unlikely to be bought by countries not presently using the type, the aircraft is so prolific across the Middle East that Saudi will find a large market for operational F-5 airframes and spare parts carcasses.

According to Saudi fast jet pilots, Riyadh attempted to sell F-5 to Brazil – another user who have maintained and upgraded the capability of their fleet – but asked too high a price in a marketplace where the cost of advanced inventory aircraft (such as earlier Block 10/15 Lockheed Martin F-16) is rapidly dropping. Morocco and Tunisia represent the next best options, currently operating 39 and 15 F-5 respectively; though both countries are reported to be haggling with Lockheed Martin over F-16 buys. Thus, whilst an F-5 sale could go ahead with Saudi, increasingly few countries are willing to invest in technology that Northrop Grumman itself no longer produces.

The Tornado IDS fleet is receiving upgrades through 2006, aimed at pushing back the type’s out-of-service data to 2020. The GR.4 MLU-1 upgrade with make Saudi Tornadoes capable of employing Paveway III GPS-guided munitions, Alenia Marconi Systems Brimstone anti-armour weapons, and the 250-300km Matra B.A.e. Dynamics Storm Shadow missile. Indications suggest the Tornado ADV aircraft may be converted for the strike and reconnaissance role.

The air-to-ground versions of the F-15S and the Tornado fleet will adequately provide the long-range strike and reconnaissance requirements of the RSAF. Speculation instead focuses on two other capability areas that will require procurement decisions within the next 2-8 years. The first, precipitated by the retirement of the F-5E/F fleet, is the requirement for an inexpensive and highly survivable aircraft capable of carrying out the ground attack role. Tornado IDS and F-15S could carry out this role, and options include not replacing the F-5E/F at all or replacing the type with a smaller number of expensive F-15S, in addition to converted Tornado ADV. Boeing are keen to keep the F-15 production lines open and is believed to be offering new build F-15s at discount rates, bringing with them the advantage of improved standardisation in the polyglot RSAF Though a longer-term perspective suggests that the maintenance costs of large and complex aircraft like the Tornado and F-15 make near-term replacement with a new medium or light multi-role aircraft more palatable, the higher initial costs of absorbing a new type may cancel out prospective savings. Furthermore, until sufficient pilots can be trained, the retirement of the F-5E/F represents a boon for operational readiness, arguing against an expansion of platform numbers. It is quite possible that, with the RSAF focused on consolidating its manpower and training (plus maintenance) in the near-term, Saudi Arabia may skip a generation of aircraft procurement, dipping into the market in the latter part of the decade when many older Saudi F-15 reach the end of their lifespans.

If, on the other hand, Saudi Arabia does make a new purchase, a number of systems would meet RSAF requirements. Whilst medium multi-role aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter, Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet meet the preferences of Saudi aircrew for larger or multi-engined aircraft, they may not offer significantly better performance than new generation light fighters such as the F-16, Saab Gripen JAS-39X, or Dassault Mirage 2000, which can take advantage of increasing miniaturisation of electronics and weaponry to carry advanced electronic warfare suites, conformal fuel tanks, in-flight refuelling probes, and therefore greater payloads at increased ranges. This obviates the need to maintain separate types for long-range strike and short-range close air support. Minister of Defence and Aviation Prince Sultan is believed to be strongly behind a near-term F-16 purchase, while Crown Prince Abdullah opposes near-term fleet replacement.

Saudi is unlikely to order close air support versions of the BAe Hawks, as the day of the small, dedicated subsonic attack aircraft may have passed, both in terms of capability and the spiralling costs of such aircraft relative to high-performance and low cost surplus F-16s.

A more distant future procurement decision – which will need to be taken in the 2005-2010 timeframe – concerns whether an optimised air superiority fighter is needed to replace the F-15C/D fleet. This will greatly depend on how the air-to-air capabilities of regional rivals increase. Though the northern Gulf States present the more explicit threat to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has a habit of mirroring Israeli procurement practices in the air superiority sphere. If Israel receives significant numbers of the Lockheed Martin F-22, Saudis may follow suit, imposing a highly damaging financial burden on Saudi defence spending.

United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defence (UAEAFAD)
Though the UAE has spent $9.9 billion on advanced combat aircraft - $3.4 billion on the Mirage 2000-9 series and $6.5 billion on the F-16 – there are still a number of significant peripheral capabilities that the UAE must develop during this decade. Strong budgetary support, a willingness to enter into collaborative development, and a preference for top-grade equipment are the hallmarks of UAE aerospace procurement policy. The latter feature stems from the threat profile facing the UAE – Iran’s growing military prowess.

Ongoing speculation surrounds potential purchases of trainer aircraft by the UAE The UAEAFAD needs pilots quickly, placing a heavy burden on existing trainer aircraft. In 1997 it was announced that a further 12 advanced jet trainers may be required, and Dubai is also known to be interested in replacing its aged Hawk Mk. 61 trainers. The purchase of new jet trainer looks likely to involve the procurement of up to 12 further Hawks and the upgrade of the remainder of the fleet to a common standard. Attempts to supply 30 German Alpha Jets to the UAE in October 1999 were frustrated by the very high refurbishment costs required – though each jet would have reportedly only cost $1 million, each required up to $6 million of reconditioning.

The UAE is also looking beyond the current generation of trainers into the field of advanced next generation jet trainers and light combat aircraft. In January 2000, the UAE signed two Memorandum of Understanding with DASA, signalling UAE interest in influencing and sponsoring the collaborative development of the DASA AT-2000 (or MAKO) project, which is planned to move into advanced development in 2007-10. The UAE previously expressed interest in the Karakoram K-8, a trainer jointly developed by Egypt, Pakistan, and China. The development of a next generation trainer could represent a significant technology and expertise transfer to the UAE that would assist in its indigenous maintenance and support industry.

The UAE is likely to improve its transport aircraft fleet, either by upgrading its C-130H fleet or by buying new or inventory CN-235 or C-130, standardising on existing types. Standardisation is also required across the transport helicopter fleet, where over half of the fleet are more than twenty years old. Upgrades for UAE Super Pumas were purchased in November 2001, involving $125 million reconditioning of 25 engines and installation of glass cockpits at Eurocopter Romania, between 2001-04. Speculation concerning large helicopter fleet purchases identifies a wide range of potential purchases, with reports suggesting that 30 Mangusta A-129 or Westland Lynx may be purchased, while other reports suggest 40 Agusta AB-412HP Griffins and 10 further IAR 330L Pumas. Further Westland AS-532 Cougar sales may also be on the cards.

In the mid-term, a hopeful U.S. defence establishment has identified the UAE as a possible export customer for the Boeing MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which would provide a combination of helicopter and transport aircraft capabilities that the UAE might find attractive. The aircraft is able to deliver medium loads, including troops, at relatively long ranges (700km) much faster and therefore with less exposure that helicopters could. At around $40 million each, however, the UAE will think carefully about investing in this unproven and trouble stricken project.

The UAE may also invest in refuelling aircraft in order to boost the endurance or range of its Mirage 2000-9 and F-16 aircraft. This would allow UAE F-16 to strike out to ranges of 1,150km with significant ordnance loads, and allow F-16 escorted UAE Mirages to move within striking range of Tehran (using stand-off air-launched cruise missiles). The UAE has been linked to a possible purchase of three Boeing 767 tanker/transport aircraft (Italy purchased four similar aircraft for $700 million). Alternatively, the UAE could purchase ex-U.S. Navy Viking S-3 aircraft and employ them as small airborne tankers. The Vikings would also be able to act as maritime patrol aircraft and carry out anti-submarine and anti-shipping attacks.

The biggest "spender" when it comes to the defence in the last ten years was definitely the UAE. No less but $9.9 were spent on acquisition of advanced combat aircraft. For the future the UAEAFAD is not satisfied only with purchasing available equipment, but is heavily involved in sponsoring development of new aircraft: the F-16F depicted here, is a "custom" variant, developed to UAE specifications. (Photo: Lockheed-Martin)

One of the most recent acquisitions by UAEAFAD is a batch of AH-64 Apache helicopters. These are to become the main means of close air support for the UAE armed forces in the next 20 years. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Notes about Author
Dr. Michael Knights worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, and has meanwhile undertaken extensive research on lessons learned from the U.S. military operations in Iraq during and since 1990. He earned his doctorate at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and has worked as a defense journalist for the Gulf States Newsletter and Jane's Intelligence Review.